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Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, the littoral states of the Strait of Malacca, 
implemented an arsenal of anti-piracy mechanisms that effectively eradicated maritime 
piracy from the subregion. The subregional cooperation was a response to the proliferation 
of maritime piracy and sea robbery attacks, especially prior to 2004. This sparked a debate 
on ASEAN’s capacity to securitise its maritime domain. The nature of the interplay between 
subregional and regional anti-piracy initiatives lies at the core of this research. 
 
The thesis is driven by a research puzzle of whether subregional cooperation is 
region-divergent or region-convergent to regionalism. This taxonomy mirrors Christopher 
Dent’s analytical framework, which is adapted to test the subregional anti-piracy cooperation 
in the Strait of Malacca and its effect on pan-ASEAN maritime security mechanisms. The 
main finding contends that subregional cooperation is region-convergent to regionalism. The 
Strait of Malacca counter-piracy cooperation has been found to bolster ASEAN-wide initiatives 
at securitising its maritime domain. The region-divergent and region-convergent hypotheses 
are tested on a representative sample of subregional and region-wide anti-piracy 
mechanisms. Juxtaposing the cases against theoretical and empirical claims made by the 
two hypotheses, the region-convergent hypothesis emerges as a more credible explanation 
of the subregionalism-regionalism causal relationship. 
 
By disaggregating the maritime security architecture of ASEAN, this thesis suggests 
that sound subregional cooperation is vital to the development of effective region-wide 
mechanisms to counter sea piracy. The policy prescription based on this thesis is to base 
regional security approaches on transparent, open-ended and potent networks of bilateral 
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Presenting a puzzle-driven and theory-testing approach, the enquiry was 
posed by Professor Christopher Dent in his journal article published in 2006, entitled 
The New Economic Bilateralism in Southeast Asia: Region-Convergent or Region- 
Divergent?. He asks a fundamental question: is bilateralism region-convergent or 
region-divergent? Whereas Dent’s research scrutinises the bilateralism-regionalism 
nexus, this thesis is interested in a wider subregionalism-regionalism causal 
relationship. The main research question therefore follows: Does subregionalism 
beget regionalism, or does it hinder regional integration? Spin-off questions include 
inquiries into the roles of subregionalism and regionalism in the maritime security 




These broad questions lie at the heart of the thesis’ inquiry. To study the 
subregionalism-regionalism nexus, the key concepts need to be operationalised. 
Therefore, subregionalism is scrutinised through the counter-piracy cooperation 
among the littoral states in the Strait of Malacca, namely Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Regionalism is examined through the prism of ASEAN-wide anti-piracy 




The overall argument presented by this thesis contends that subregionalism is 
region-convergent to regionalism. The following chapters present the methodology
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and theory-testing analysis on the basis of which it is concluded that the subregional 













Professor Christopher Dent highlights that the intensification of bilateralism- 
regionalism interaction has made the “interface between these two trends critically 
important to understand, with primary regard to their compatibility and how this in 
turn affects the new multi-layered economic relationships and governance 
structures” (Dent, 2006: 82). I contend that the same call of significance applies to 
my research. An increasing number of states in Southeast Asia engage in 
cooperative schemes surrounding issues of national, and more importantly, 
transnational security. The governance structures underpinning such mechanisms, 
such as subregional cooperative arrangements like the Malacca Straits Patrols 
(MSP), ought to be examined from the viewpoint of their raison d'être. In addition, 
Dent suggests that “important lessons for other, especially developing, regional 
groups may be derived from this study, as well as new understandings of the 
economic bilateralism–regionalism relationship more generally” (Dent, 2006: 82). 
Clearly, with the increasing “regionalisation” of the Asia-Pacific region, regional 
institutions like ASEAN and ARF are expected to play an increasingly greater role in 
securitising the regional maritime territories in light of transnational threats.
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The “ASEAN way” of addressing security concerns emphasises individual 
states and their exclusive right to tackle these threats at the national level without 
external intervention. These concepts are also known as the principles of 
comprehensive security and resilience and stem from the key sovereignty pillar of 
the ASEAN way. As maritime piracy has an adverse impact on the entire Southeast 
Asian region, it should be studied why other ASEAN countries, in spite of also being 
indirectly affected, exhibited no interest in supporting concrete measures and 
adopting political declarations to attend to the problem. It is also essential to 
determine what concessions on the ASEAN way can be made in the interest of 
enhanced maritime security cooperation. An example of such a concession is the 
permission of a hot pursuit up to 5 nautical miles into the territorial waters of a 
neighbouring country. The significance of this research on subregional approach and 
regionalism in maritime security lies in its utility to precipitate critical insights into how 




Malaysian, Indonesian and Singaporean approaches to countering maritime 
piracy indicate the degree to which the logic of national-regional resilience is 
applicable. It is important to determine which security questions are best addressed 
by individual states, and at what point a regional approach becomes necessary. As a 
top Singaporean military officer, Winston Choo, once said, “firm and strong bilateral 
ties will provide the foundation for multilateral cooperation” (Choo, quoted in 
Acharya, 1990: 1-2). The rationality of this statement can be tested by looking at the 
subregional cooperation among the Strait of Malacca littoral states and the 
subsequent developments in ASEAN’s regional response to fighting maritime piracy. 
Exploring the cause-and-effect relationship between pan-regional initiatives and
- 4 -  





The thesis is significant due to its potential to generate spin-off inquiries and 
therefore illuminate related non-traditional security (NTS) phenomena within 
Southeast Asia. Examining the causal mechanism in question can forecast the future 
role of subregional cooperative ties among states amid intensifying engagement of 
ASEAN in maritime security concerns. The research question also enquires how 
domestic socio-political settings fit into regional security strategies. Importantly, it 
also examines the question posed by Ganesan and Amer, who enquire whether 
multilateralism and bi-/trilateralism are reconcilable, or whether they are of a zero- 




To date, no conclusive study of the causal relationship between 
subregionalism and regionalism in ASEAN in the domain of sea piracy has been 
conducted. This research project builds upon literature on international political 
economy and NTS that offer solid scholarship on the causal relationship between 
economic bilateralism and regionalism. Research examining economic aspects of 
the bilateralism-regionalism relationship is extrapolated to demonstrate the 




Further significance of maritime security issues is exhibited in its 
contemporary relevance to decision-making in ASEAN, especially regarding the 
ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The disputes continue to 
dominate the agenda at many of the ASEAN Summits. This research elucidates the
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formation of regional approaches as an effect of subregional cooperation. It is 
claimed that if subregionalism facilitates regional approaches (the region-convergent 
argument), then it should be a founding block for enhancing the regional cooperation 
in contentious maritime security issues, such as in the South China Sea. In addition, 
sea piracy in Southeast Asian waters remains a modern-day issue, hardly an 
antiquated concern of the past. The timeliness and magnitude of sea piracy in the 
Strait of Malacca is aptly demonstrated by the recent incident from the 23rd of April 
 
2014, when pirates raided an oil tanker in the Malacca Straits, stealing three million 
litres of diesel (BBC Asia, 2014). This is why it is essential to comprehend the 
transboundary nature of maritime piracy and how measures addressing this issue 











Over 70,000 ships sail through the Strait of Malacca annually. With the 
growing energy demands and increasing worldwide trade, the Japanese Ministry of 
Land Infrastructure and Transport predicts this number to increase to 114,000 
vessels by 2020 (Simon, 2010: 3). Ships in the Strait of Malacca become vulnerable 
targets of piracy attacks and sea robbery due to it being merely 1.7 miles wide at its 
narrowest point. The number of attacks increased steeply in 2004 and was in decline 
until the recent years of 2011 and 2012. The graph below (Fig. 1) summarises the 
number of reported actual or attempted attacks since 2001.
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The number of attacks declined sharply after 2004, which may be a result of 
the subregional counter-piracy mechanisms, namely the MSP. Furthermore, the 
tsunami disaster in 2004, and the 2005 Aceh Peace Agreement point to the 
argument that maritime piracy originates from domestic, mostly Indonesian, socio- 
economic milieus. It should be noted that the data obtained from the International 
Maritime Bureau - International Chamber of Commerce (IMB-ICC) and the 
International Maritime Organisation - Global Integrated Shipping Information System 
(IMO-GISIS) are limited, as “they are based on voluntary reports from shippers and 
therefore do not represent a complete record of pirate attacks“ (Bradford, 2008: 475). 
It seems that either IMO statistics also include petty crimes and attacks against 
tugboats or that the IMO receives a higher number of attack reports. Due to the 
discrepancies in data, an arithmetic mean is calculated for each year to show the 
overall trend in the number of piracy attacks.
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As demonstrated, subregional anti-piracy cooperation between the littoral 
states had successfully eradicated sea piracy from the Strait from 2008 to 2010. 
While 37 attempted or actual piracy attacks took place in 2004, there were only 
two attacks attempted in 2008 (Schuman, 2009). Anti-piracy initiatives that can be 
ascribed to this achievement include the MSP, the Information Fusion Centre 
(IFC), Eyes in the Sky (EiS), as well as the Regional Cooperation Agreement 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). These 
initiatives resulted predominantly from the subregional cooperation among the 
littoral states in the Strait of Malacca, despite the issue concerning the economies 
of all the ASEAN members. 
 
It can also be suggested that these trilateral mechanisms were a reaction 
to pressure from the IMO, from industry (especially after Lloyd’s declared the 
Malacca Strait a war-risk zone) and from external powers (especially Japan) to 
deal with the threat to international shipping posed by piracy and armed robbery 




The issue of maritime piracy in the Strait of Malacca seems to have 
 
resurfaced post-2010. This development could reflect ASEAN institutional 
weakness, subregional anti-piracy measures becoming obsolete, deteriorating 
domestic socio- economic conditions or simply pirates adopting more sophisticated 
methods. It is 
also possible that the Southeast Asian region, due to its socio-economic 
geographic conditions, is naturally conducive to maritime piracy and the new 
piracy attacks are part of a natural variation. As much as it is outside the scope of 
this research to investigate the roots of the rise in piracy attacks numbers, it 
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becomes clear that the issue of maritime piracy ought to appear prominently on 




However, it can be claimed that should the maritime piracy concerns in the 
Strait of Malacca have been resolved via ASEAN-affiliated security fora, such as 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or the East Asia Summit (EAS), their 
fundamental principles of non-interference, consensual decision-making, and quiet 





Although effective regional approaches to countering sea piracy in the 
Strait of Malacca are still lacking, there has been a prominent emergence of pan-
ASEAN developments in recent years. This is demonstrated in developments 
such as the establishment of the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (eAMF) in 
2012, convening of the 3rd eAMF and 5th ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) in August 
2014 in Vietnam, and the issued statement on the strengthening of regional 
maritime cooperation represented by points 15 and 18 of the Chairman’s 
Statement of the 24th ASEAN Summit in May 2014. This points out to the 
awakening of ASEAN-wide approaches to counter sea piracy in the region that 
could have been triggered by subregional action in the Strait of Malacca. Also, the 
proliferation in the region-wide activities to 
promote maritime security highlights ASEAN’s readiness to integrate the region in 

















In order to maintain academic precision, two key terms - subregionalism and 
regionalism - are defined. Taxonomies and definitions differ across the wide array 
of schools conceptualising collaborative intergovernmental arrangements 
endogenous or exogenous to regional institutional settings. Christopher Dent’s 
functional definitions are used for their precision and conceptual range. As the 
definition of subregionalism stems from the definition of regionalism, it is necessary 
to first define ‘regionalism’. According to Dent, regionalism “may be generally 
viewed as the structures, processes and arrangements that are working towards 
greater coherence within a specific international or global region in terms of 





Building on this definition, the logic of subregionalism works similarly to 
regionalism, but involving two or more geo-political entities that are part of the 
same regional institution. This definition also brings in Dent’s account on 
bilateralism, under which “just two geo-political entities (i.e. in most cases nation-
states) are involved in the enhanced co-operative and integrative arrangements 
being sought” (Dent, 2006: 83). The cooperation between the littoral states in the 
Strait of Malacca falls within this definition, as it involves three geo-political 




It is important to note that ASEAN has not yet agreed on a definition of 
maritime security, despite referring to it in its official statements. A quasi-definition 
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has been offered in the ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Cooperation 
against Piracy and Other Threats to Security (ASCAP), which restricts maritime 
security to “piracy and armed robbery against ships and the potential for terrorist 
attacks on vulnerable sea shipping" (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003). Nonetheless, 
many Southeast Asian academics have extended this definition to encompass 
“non-traditional security issues like environmental degradation, weapons 
proliferation, as well as arms, drugs and human smuggling” (Banlaoi in Ho and 
Raymond, 2005: 60). Since maritime security concerns within Southeast Asia are 
frequently multidimensional and comprehensive, ‘maritime security’ is regarded in 
this wider definition.  
 
Various definitions of sea piracy have been provided by the UN, IMO and 
IMB. This thesis uses the IMB’s definition, as it includes both maritime piracy and 
sea robbery attacks, defining sea piracy as “an act of boarding or attempting to 
board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with 
the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act” 
(International Maritime Bureau, 2007: 2). Moreover, the IMO definition “explicitly 
underlines piracy as those acts carried out for private ends, which excludes acts 
of terrorism, insurgency, or those of environmental activists” (Herbert-Burns, 
Bateman and Lehr, 2008: 75). This definition helps to maintain the analytical focus 




‘Resilience’ and ‘comprehensive security’, two concepts essential to ASEAN 
security policies, should be explained. Resilience refers to the “ASEAN-shared 
approach to security emphasizing domestic regime consolidation” (Emmers, 2009: 
- 11 -  
159). Following in the same vein, comprehensive security is “based on the 
proposition that national security does not only reside in the absence of external 
military hostility but also in the presence of socio-economic development within 
national boundaries” (Lizée and Peou, quoted in Tan and Acharya, 2004: 6). As 
discussed above, both of these terms are instrumental to understanding ASEAN’s 
approach to tackling security concerns.
- 12 -  





This research employs a traditional research methodology, scrutinising the 
causal mechanism between the independent and the dependent variable. Prior to 
outlining the two hypotheses considered by this thesis, it is essential to isolate the 
independent and dependent variables, identify confounding variables and noise, and 
explain how the variables are operationalised. This section also describes the 











Variations in subregional cooperation, specifically dealing with issues of 
maritime security in Southeast Asia, are measured in qualitative terms. Playing to the 
strengths of qualitative research, the subregional cooperative mechanisms are 
analysed using a series of theoretical and empirical expectations based on claims 
made by the two contrasting hypotheses. In this way, it is possible to elucidate the 





The causal factor is operationalised to explore the nature and scope of anti- 
piracy mechanisms introduced in 2001-2012 by the Strait of Malacca littoral states. 
Variations in the independent variable are measured by scrutinising selected anti- 
piracy initiatives. Their levels of complexity, longevity, impact, budget, and states’ 
compliance are factors determining variations. Therefore, qualitative methods, such
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as case study analysis, are implemented. Variations in subregional cooperation (X) 
 






Qualitative methods of the independent variable include a case study analysis 
of subregional initiatives surrounding maritime security, namely the MSP, the 
Cooperative Mechanism and the Batam Statement. These mechanisms were 
chosen, as they are considered representative of the range of subregional anti-piracy 




High levels of subregional cooperation are observed by sharing intelligence, 
data, and information, executing joint military exercises, holding regular meetings of 
state officials, and adopting binding agreements. Low levels of subregional 
cooperation are indicated by coordinated (not joint) military operations, limited 












The observed outcome in the causal relationship is the formation of ASEAN- 
wide regional maritime security initiatives. Measuring variations in the dependent 
variable relies more heavily on qualitative methods, such as a case study analysis. 
As Dent also argues, region-convergent or region-divergent outcomes are “generally 
difficult to quantify, and qualitative judgements can in most cases offer more viable 
methods of evaluation” (Dent, 2006).
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The three case studies of ASEAN-wide cooperation in countering piracy are 
ReCAAP, the AMF, and ASCAP. By analysing the aforementioned cases, it is 
possible to track the nuances concerning maritime security and anti-piracy 
measures. By scrutinising the qualitative data, it can be revealed whether, and to 
what degree, ideas diffusion and state socialisation played roles in the development 




High levels of the dependent variable are indicated by highly institutionalised 
mechanisms that proactively shape decision-making procedures. These include 
adoptions of codes of conduct or the foundation of organisations regulating security 
at sea. Low levels of regional cooperation are observed by merely issuing non- 
binding joint communiqués briefly outlining maritime security concerns, minimal 
attention to maritime security in ASEAN joint statements and the absence of these 
concerns from ASEAN’s agendas. The level of institutionalisation, dynamic 
participation, and the binding or non-binding status of agreements are all to be 










The one confounding variable that should be controlled for is the involvement 
of extraregional powers. This can be measured the same way as subregional 
cooperation (X). The only difference is that the analysis measures cooperation in 
maritime security between extraregional powers and any of the ASEAN member 
state.
- 15 -  
 
 
The role of external powers, such as China or the US, is recognised as a 
confounding variable, as it correlates with both independent and dependent 
variables. Extraregional actors, such as China, have a strong preference for 
bilateralism (Emmers, 2007: 18). As a result, ASEAN member states are more prone 
to cooperate with China bilaterally and such cooperation would be less likely to spill 
over into multilateralism or any institutionalised form of regionalism. Consequently, 
the confounding variable (Z) is positively correlated with the independent variable, as 
the greater the influence of China, the more preference for stronger bilateral ties. 
The variable Z is negatively correlated with the dependent variable, as the more 
prominent the presence of China, the lower the probability of forming pan-ASEAN 
regional initiatives. This is due to China being an extraregional actor, which hinders 
the emergence of regional activities. In contrast, close ties of ASEAN member states 
with extraregional actors downplay regional norms and confidence-building activities 




Inter-ASEAN relations should also be taken into account, as ASEAN countries 
are less likely to develop a joint anti-piracy scheme if they face mutual antagonism. A 
source of possible antagonism is the contentious issue of territorial disputes in South 
China Sea. These variables need to be controlled for, as they could interfere with the 
examined causal mechanism.






This research tests two contrasting hypotheses that mirror a debate set forth 
by Christopher Dent. Whereas Professor Dent scrutinises Singapore and Thailand’s 
active bilateral economic diplomacy, this thesis examines the Strait of Malacca 
littoral states and their cooperation in countering maritime piracy. Dent studies the 
impact upon ASEAN’s economic projects, such as AFTA, and upon ASEAN 
promoting regional economic integration in general. This thesis analyses the impact 
upon ASEAN-led maritime security mechanisms and on ASEAN’s attempts to bolster 
regional maritime security cooperation among its members. There are evident 
parallels in the logic of the causal mechanism between Dent’s and this thesis’ 
research variables. This, in itself, constitutes a foundation for the convergence of this 
thesis’ research project with Dent’s analytical framework. 
 
Before proceeding with the causal mechanism and its bearing on the 
hypotheses, it is vital to provide definitions of the two aforementioned concepts. 
“Region-convergent bilateralism can make positive contributions to the development 
of regionalism, whereas region-divergent bilateralism essentially undermines 









Null Hypothesis (H0): Subregional cooperation is not correlated to regional 
integration.
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The null hypothesis states that there is no correlation between the subregional 
cooperation and regional integration. However, in the absence of evidence failing to 
falsify H0, it is reasonable to assume that there is a correlation between the two 
variables. This becomes evident in the following chapters, which provide sufficient 
evidence falsifying H0. Assuming the falsification of H0, the research proceeds to 




The two alternative hypotheses considered in this thesis are: 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Subregional cooperation is region-divergent to regional 
integration. 





Both of the hypotheses considered in this thesis are explained below in terms 
of falsifiable theoretical and empirical expectations. These expectations are later 










The first hypothesis suggests that subregional cooperation hinders region- 
wide approaches. This is due to the preference for bilateralism (and subregionalism, 
by extension) when dealing with questions of transnational security. Often ASEAN- 
based principles hamper the emergence of effective anti-piracy mechanisms, as they
- 18 -  







Adopting Dent’s approach, the causal mechanism in the region-divergent 
hypothesis is four-fold and the four points of contention contributing to this outcome 
are identified: 1) undermining and capturing effects, 2) intensifying subregionalism 
and regional inter-state rivalry, 3) reinforced power asymmetries and 4) multi-speed 




All of the aforementioned points need to be disaggregated and adjusted to fit 
the particularities of this thesis’ research. Each of the points then need to be 
presented in terms of their theoretical and empirical expectations and the necessary 




Dent claims that 1) “intensified bilateralism may undermine the integrity or 
capture key aspects of regional organizations, including their regional economic 
projects” (Dent, 2006: 86). This issue transpires predominantly when “certain 
bilateral partnership [is] dominating the organization’s agenda at the expense of 




The theoretical expectation of dominating the regional agenda could be 
falsified if evidence shows that the actions of subregional cooperation do not 
overshadow the initiatives and objectives of a regional organisation.  To apply this 
theoretical expectation to the cases that this research examines, the mechanisms
- 19 -  
introduced to counter maritime piracy in the Strait of Malacca need to overtake 




Under the empirical expectations, subregional mechanisms need to be robust 
and efficient enough that any attempts at coordinating a pan-regional counter-piracy 
initiative would be redundant. A falsification of this claim is seen if subregional 
cooperation is not robust and efficient enough and does not make regional attempts 




ASEAN maritime security strategies are plagued with such concerns. The 
most apparent example is the South China Sea territorial dispute, whereby issues 
from states like Vietnam and China appear to take over the ASEAN Summit agenda. 
This seemed to have been the case at the 24th ASEAN Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, 
Myanmar. Such disputes are divisive to the ASEAN community, as there is a lack of 
consensus on how to resolve territorial disputes. Similarly, in the case of piracy in the 
Strait of Malacca, intensified subregionalism between the littoral states might 




Another point of contention states that 2) “deepening bilateralism within a 
region can create increasingly convoluted patterns of reactive counter-balancing 
manoeuvres amongst the region’s constituent states, leading to potentially 
hazardous inter-state rivalry” (Dent, 2006: 86). This point is contingent upon whether 
achievements in counter-piracy actions are regarded in terms of absolute or relative 
gains. Should there be only relative gains, then the danger of reactive 
counterbalancing would upset regional integrative efforts. To answer this question
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more precisely, it first needs to be determined who exactly benefits, and how, from 
the increased security and eradicated sea piracy in the Strait of Malacca. If it is the 
littoral states only, then Dent’s second point should be considered supportive to the 
region-divergent argument. Yet should it benefit the entire ASEAN region equally, 
then there is lack of evidence to claim that the case study offers any support towards 




There is an important distinction between how neo-liberal institutionalism and 
neo-realism view dense bilateralism. The former perceives dense bilateralism from a 
cooperative international relations view, describing the development of conditions 
from which regionalism thrives. The latter points to the competitive inter-state rivalry, 
under which regional partnerships are difficult to cultivate. It is this latter perspective 
of international relations with which this point of contention is concerned.  To falsify 
this theoretical claim is to observe a situation where it is evident that increasing 




In terms of empirical expectations based on this theoretical claim, there needs 
to emerge a situation where Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia’s deepening 
integration jeopardises the interests of other ASEAN states. If maritime security is a 
zero-sum game, the Strait of Malacca littoral states could indeed trigger antagonism 
among their regional partners. This is explained by the first mover advantage, where 
the littoral states are the first to claim success of eradicating piracy and thus gain 
international recognition and the support of the global powers. In this way, deepening 
integration on a subregional level could potentially hinder regional attempts at 
building up a multilateral mechanism to counter piracy in the region. This claim can
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be falsified if evidence shows that deepening subregional integration in fact aids 
regionalism. If the evidence shows that international actors liaise with the entire 
region and the littoral states do not abuse their position of a first mover, then this 




The third point is the notion that 3) “unchecked bilateralism serves to further 
exaggerate or reinforce power asymmetries within a region, which in turn may work 
against regional community-building” (Dent, 2006: 86). Power asymmetries are 
reflected in the way states deal with issues of maritime security. States might wish to 
showcase their naval capabilities and thus intimidate the militarily weaker states. The 
littoral states in the Strait of Malacca have considerable military capabilities that can 
also be demonstrated through anti-piracy initiatives. Should this be the case, it is 





To follow up on the neo-realist perspectives, bilateralism (or subregionalism) 
often works out in favour of more resourceful and economically robust partners, as 
they are better positioned to close better deals. They are not, in turn, mitigated by 
checks and balances otherwise imposed by regional organisations. This logic of 
realpolitik increases intra-regional suspicion against big players and upsets patterns 
of balanced regional integration. An observation that subregional cooperation leads 
to a balanced way in which deals are made between ASEAN members and the 
bigger players would falsify this claim.
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Looking at the way ASEAN members interact with their regional partners and 
big players, empirical expectations in this claim points out that the littoral states 
amplify their powers by implementing mechanisms to counter piracy. This leads to 
an asymmetry within the region whereby the littoral states enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy from the structures of ASEAN. In such a scenario, finding common ground 
for further security integration within ASEAN becomes increasingly difficult. It is 
important to analyse whether the littoral states gain any leverage by engaging in the 
fight against maritime piracy and whether they exercise their powers in a responsible 
manner towards their regional partners. If not, then there are reasons to believe that 
the region-divergent hypothesis cannot be rejected. Conversely, this claim can be 
falsified on an empirical basis should an observation be made that the littoral states 
do not seek to enhance their power position within ASEAN and that international 




The last point says that 4) “multi-speed economic bilateralism may exacerbate 
the existing development divide within a regional organization” (Dent, 2006: 86). 
Even though Dent examines economic bilateralism, regional development divides 




It is important to look at how welfare gains are distributed. If sub-regional 
cooperation generates welfare gains only for the signatories rather than the entire 
regional group, then region-divergent outcomes are more likely to emerge. Regional 
member states with stronger economic and technocratic capabilities are often 
permitted to run much further ahead of those with weaker capacities. While this point 
may seem evident given the existing development disparities within a regional group,
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it risks making the power asymmetry even more pronounced. This works against the 
overarching objective of regional community-building. Conversely, subregional action 
may benefit the entire region equally in a relative-sum manner. If this is found to be 




Under an empirical expectation of the next point, countering maritime piracy in 
the Strait of Malacca would need to have a detrimental effect on the economies of 
other ASEAN member states. Welfare gains could be distributed unequally and only 
the littoral states could benefit from the improved security. In such a case, regional 
community-building is considered hampered by the development divide. The 
economic capabilities of the littoral states in relation to the rest of the regional 
grouping need to be taken into account. It may be the case that eradicating the 
piracy from the Strait of Malacca forces pirates to operate in other areas of 
Southeast Asia, effectively deepening the developmental divide within the region. 
However, this claim is falsifiable should it be considered that countering piracy in the 
Strait of Malacca has a benefit to all ASEAN members equally. In this case, the 
economies of all ASEAN states would benefit equally, which in fact would even out 




Dent’s conceptual framework provides a checklist to assess whether a 
particular case of subregional cooperation acts as a hindrance to regional 
cooperative endeavours. Empirical evidence from the Strait of Malacca is juxtaposed 
against the points to test the region-divergent hypothesis and to reach conclusions 
about the nature of the relationship between the variables this thesis scrutinises.
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This hypothesis asserts that subregional cooperation bolsters pan-regional 
integration.  Once pan-ASEAN approaches emerge, they supplement the existing 
subregional arrangements. Subregional cooperation serves to provide a 
substructural foundation for regionalism to emerge. Subregional cooperation and 
region-wide approaches can coexist in a mutually-enhancing relationship. 
Subregional cooperation can be the core of anti-piracy mechanisms while regional 
approaches are at its periphery. Together they thus form the model of maritime 
security architecture in Southeast Asia. This model was described by Ganesan and 
Amer (2010) as a layered process of the core and the periphery radiating outwards, 




Dent offers a two-fold argument in support of the hypothesis that subregional 
cooperation is region-convergent to pan-regional arrangements. He claims that 1) 
“bilateralism may provide a sub-structural or ‘latticed’ foundation for regionalism to 
develop”. His second point of contention under the region-convergent hypothesis 




Theoretical expectations of his ‘latticed’ foundation point suggest that a 
regional arrangement is more desirable than a dense web of bilateral agreements. 
This is due to reduced transaction costs, synergies, better coordination and less 
room for miscalculation.
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The empirical expectation under this point suggests that a regional agreement 
is reached after the proliferation of bilateral webs across a given region. This claim 
has an empirical support in the fact that the AMF was founded in 2010, following a 
period of strong bilateral cooperation in maritime security affairs among the littoral 
states. To falsify this claim is to witness evidence that regional arrangements in 
maritime security fail to be achieved despite a large network of bilateral (or 




The second point of contention relates to 2) “congruent processes and 
objectives, whereby bilateralism and regionalism may be involved in serving similar 
ends, and even working in concert with the other” (Dent, 2006: 85). This point is 
concerned with a process rather than a structure. On a theoretical basis, the goals, 
motivations and objectives in securitising ASEAN’s maritime region need to be in line 




Empirically, tackling maritime piracy in the Strait of Malacca needs to be 
aligned with wider ASEAN maritime security objectives. The success at eradicating 
sea piracy from the Strait of Malacca ought to be welcomed across the ASEAN 
board. Being in concert with ASEAN’s envisioned security community, the success in 
the Strait of Malacca might be portrayed as a showcase example of the need to 
implement transnational measures to tackle NTS threats. As such, wider regional 
mechanisms may emerge as spin-off arrangements to securitise the Southeast 
Asian waters. This empirical expectation can also be falsified if there lacks evidence 
of ASEAN working towards the same objectives as the littoral states.
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As shown, each point of contention represents a falsifiable claim that forms 
theoretical and empirical expectations. These expectations are adapted to each of 
the group of the selected representative cases. In Chapters III and IV, each of the 
theoretical and empirical expectations are firstly formulated to fit the particularities of 
the case examined. Subsequently, the case is examined in terms of whether is 
falsifies the theoretical and the empirical expectation. There is no requirement to 
falsify both the theoretical and the empirical expectation in order to reject the point of 
contention. The claim is also falsified if a particular case demonstrates the absence 




The cases of anti-piracy cooperation are not treated as self-containing 
mechanisms, but rather, they are regarded in the wider context of maritime security 
architecture in the region. Reaching the conclusion of whether a particular case does 
or does not falsify either of the hypotheses is not sufficient to pass final judgement 
on the region-divergent or region-convergent effect of subregional cooperation. 
Other factors are taken into account, such as the role of extra-regional actors and 
intra-ASEAN relations. For instance, intra-ASEAN relations can be impeded, if there 
is a longstanding dispute between its members, like in the case of the South China 
Sea territorial dispute. In such a case, even if subregional cooperation is found to be 
conducive to regional action in theory, in practice such a spill-over may not take 
place due to the mutual suspicion and antagonism between some of the ASEAN 
member states.
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This research plays to the strengths of a qualitative analysis by not only 
measuring the variations in the causal mechanism, but also by scrutinising the 
relationship between the variables. This approach is found to be the most indicative 
of the nature of the subregionalism-regionalism nexus. Each of the examined cases 
is analysed in its own right, taking into account its specificities. In this way, it is 
possible to adapt an approach that captures the nuances of the relationship between 
subregional and regional cooperation. It is important to find a balance between a test 
that is both robust and flexible enough to allow tweaking the testing criteria and 





Since each of these points brings in falsifiable theoretical and empirical 
expectations, they collectively form the test to determine which of the two 
hypotheses a particular case conforms to the most. After all the three subregional 
cases are tested vis-à-vis the hypotheses, a preliminary conclusion is formulated. 
This preliminary conclusion presents research findings on the subregionalism- 
regionalism relationship, as informed by subregional measures. These insights are 
complemented by the same exercise, testing the three region-wide cases of counter- 
piracy cooperation. After all six cases of subregional and regional cooperation are 
tested based on the points of contention of the two hypotheses, this research 
amalgamates the research findings of both subregional and regional representative 
cases. These findings are then extrapolated to cover the entire portfolio of counter- 
piracy cooperation within ASEAN. The research findings are subsequently 
contrasted with knowledge of the regional politics and intra-ASEAN security 
dynamics. This leads to a holistic picture of the subregional-regional relationship in
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Counter-piracy cooperation in the Strait of Malacca may be divided into 2 
categories: measures initiated by extraregional actors, and initiatives proposed by the 
littoral states, also dubbed the bottom-up building blocks (Huang, 2008). Both of these 
represent observed measurements under subregional cooperation – variable X. Due 
to historically-rooted mutual suspicion among the littoral states, maritime cooperation 




Counter-piracy measures, such as the MSP and its Eyes in the Sky (EiS), 
were so successful that “Malaysia’s deputy prime minister Najib Razak has 
applauded the MSP for the ‘sharp decrease’ in attacks since July 2004” (Storey, 
2008: 118). Subregional cooperation was, therefore, triggered by an external security 
threat that acted as a cohesive force to reinforce the notion of a common fate among 
the littoral states. The US-proposed Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) was 
rejected due to fears of the US maritime presence. The littoral states, especially 
Indonesia, view the piracy in the straits as a local problem that can be addressed by the 
three littoral States. They do not want the members of the ARF (US, Japan, China, etc) 
becoming involved in what they see as a subregional or even national issue. Given this, 
and the date, the regional statement may have influenced the increase in cooperation 
at the subregional level. The Cooperative Mechanism can be argued to have clear 
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intention is to bring the United States outside of the region. ReCAAP proposed by 
Japan was met with more success and continues its mission to this date. The 
reluctance to include the US could also explain why ReCAAP was a successful 
mechanism while Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), proposed by the United 
States was rejected. The method of framing of initiatives proposed by extraregional 
actors makes a crucial difference in their acceptance. Sovereignty plays the most 
significant role in determining which counter-piracy mechanisms are to be accepted. 
However concessions are made from time to time. For instance, with the EiS initiative, 
“it was the first time the littoral states had been willing to put aside concerns over the 
sovereignty of their territorial waters and allow foreign forces across the border” 
(Raymond, 2009: 38). It should, however, be noted here that the EiS was a form of 
cooperation that was purely symbolic. Air patrols are not very effective in locating small 
boats boarding ships at 3am in the morning. In fact, one could argue that major reason 
the three littoral States were able to limit the cooperation mechanism to safety and the 
environment was that by 2007 piracy was being brought under control. 
 
The introduction of counter-piracy mechanisms post-2004 was not a response to 
the ASEAN-wide developments in maritime security. Rather, these processes 
were contingent upon the external security threat of maritime piracy, as well as 
“fostered by fear that external actors such as the US would interfere in regional 
maritime security affairs” (Loewen in Hofmeister and Rueppel, 2014: 16). Hence, 
evidence suggests that regionalisation does not spark off subregionalism and there 
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Pan-ASEAN counter-piracy initiatives mirror a history of lip service in a myriad of 
talk shops. All the way until the 2004 Strait of Malacca piracy crisis, ASEAN 
mostly engaged in issuing toothless declarations, statements and action plans 
concerning maritime security. Concrete projects were difficult to realise, as “some 
ASEAN countries are not affected by sea piracy and have no initiative in supporting 
the adoption of political declarations and measures to fight the problem” (Emmers, 
2007: 16). The differences are evident in the cases of countries such as Laos, which is 
landlocked, and Indonesia, which is an archipelagic nation comprising more than 
18,000 islands. Consensus was, therefore, difficult to achieve and ASEAN allowed 
the affected littoral states to deal with the issue. At present, “there is no regional or 
joint anti-piracy strategy that all Southeast Asian states adhere to” (Loewen in 
Hofmeister and Rueppel, 2014: 17). Nevertheless, certain ASEAN-wide progress has 
been visible, especially in the 2010s. Effective pan-ASEAN mechanisms emerged, 
like the eAMF and the ASEAN Information-Sharing Portal (AIP). 
 
Another noteworthy document outlining ASEAN’s future strategy in 
countering sea piracy is the  2009 Blueprint on the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community. The document appeals to “each country to develop laws to 
address cyber crimes; forge closer cooperation in fighting against sea piracy, 




To better illustrate the abovementioned points, a timeline is presented to 
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Timeline Correlating Subregional Cooperation in the Strait of Malacca 
and ASEAN-wide Initiatives in Countering Maritime Piracy 




Japan Coast Guards 




 Meeting of Specialist Officials on 
Maritime Issues 





 ASEAN Maritime Transport 
Working Group 




Trilateral Agreement on 




Work Programme to Implement 






 ARF Statement on Cooperation 
against Piracy  and Other Threats 
to Maritime Security 
ARF Workshop on Maritime 
Security 





Malacca Straits Patrols 
(MALSINDO) patrols formally 
implemented 
 
ARF Seminar on Regional 
Maritime Security 
 
Proliferation Security Initiative 
2004 ASEAN Security Community 
Plan of Action 
  The 2004 Treaty on Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters 





Eyes in the Sky Initiative  
ARF CBM: Regional Cooperation 
in Maritime Security 
Project SURPIC 




 Regional Cooperation Agreement 
on Combating Piracy and Armed 











Information Fusion Centre 
ASEAN Political-Security 
Community Blueprint 
  ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting 




 ASEAN Maritime Forum 
Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement 




 19th ASEAN Summit Chair’s 
Statement 













ASEAN Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting-Plus Expert Working 





 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting-Plus Expert Working 
Group Maritime Security Field 
Training Exercise 
*Includes only Track I Initiatives                                                                    Table 1 




As seen in the table above, there are high numbers of cooperative 
mechanisms related to Southeast Asian counter-piracy activities. Therefore, this 
thesis scrutinises only six cases, which are deemed to be representative of the 
Southeast Asian counter-piracy portfolio. Three cases represent instances of 
subregional cooperation between the littoral states and three are ASEAN-wide. Each
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case is subjected to the falsifiability tests of both hypotheses, in order to determine 
whether the hypotheses outlined can be falsified. If a hypothesis fails to be falsified, 





Each case of counter-piracy activity reflects a different degree of commitment 
from the littoral states or on the part of ASEAN. Therefore, in each category 
(subregional and ASEAN-wide initiatives) three cases are be selected ranging from a 
low degree of commitment to high. A low degree of commitment would normally 
include loose, informal or non-binding actions such as issuing statements, joint 
agreements, codes of conduct, etc. There, activities are mostly paper-based and 
serve to reiterate the commitment of the interested parties to countering piracy in the 
region. A medium level of commitment would include activities like information- 
sharing initiatives, coordinated military exercises, etc. In the category of a high 
degree of commitment there would be robust initiatives to counter maritime piracy. 
These mechanisms would be formal and binding and would include activities like 
executing joint military exercises, establishing concrete institutions serving maritime 




After all six cases are tested on whether they are able to falsify the 
hypotheses, conclusions are drawn to elucidate the subregionalism-regionalism 
nexus in the ASEAN maritime security framework. Disaggregating the chosen 
instances of cooperation helps to shed light on the causal mechanisms at play. 
These mechanisms are believed to be concurrent with one of the two hypotheses 
that this thesis considers.
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Out of the three subregional instances of counter-piracy cooperation that this 
thesis examines, the first one is the MSP, which is an instance of the high 
commitment initiative that is institutionalised and requires significant resource 
management on the part of all three states involved. Second is the Cooperative 
Mechanism, which belongs to the medium commitment category, as it is a capacity- 
building initiative. Third is the Batam Statement, which is an example of a trilateral 
agreement and thus placed in the category of a low level of commitment. All three 
cases are indigenous mechanisms established between the littoral states, even if 
their scope of activity might now include countries beyond just Singapore, Malaysia 
and Indonesia. 
 
The Batam Statement was indeed very significant because the Foreign 
Ministers of the three littoral States met for the first time since 1977 on the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore. They were able to agree on the fundamental principles that 
were serve as the basis for their cooperating with the IMO and user States in the 
discussions leading to the cooperative mechanism. The meetings to establish the 
cooperative mechanism began in Jakarta in September, 2005 (Meeting on the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental 
Protection held in Jakarta, Indonesia on 7 and 8 September 2005), just after the 
meeting in Batam, and were then completed after meetings in Kuala Lumpur in 
2006 and Singapore in 2007. Although the Batam Statement and Jakarta Statement 
stated that the three States agree to establish a new TTEG on Maritime Security, 
this proposal was dropped due to objections by Indonesia. The original focus was 
cooperation to enhance safety, security and environmental protection. As finally 
agreed at the Singapore meeting, all references to security were dropped, and the 
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Cooperative Mechanism was limited to navigational safety and environmental 
protection. The Cooperation Mechanism is controlled by the TTEG on Navigational 
Safety that has been meeting regularly since the 1970s. The cooperation 
mechanism mentions the interests of the PMO and user States, but control remains 
with three littoral States through the TTEG. In short, any threat to their sovereignty 
was rebuffed. The proposed TTEG on maritime security was never established, and 
the cooperative mechanism does not deal with piracy, armed robbery or other 
threats to maritime security. Rather, these matters are dealt with through the 
Malacca Straits Patrols, which are controlled by the three littoral States (with a very 
minor role to Thailand). 
 
Although the Cooperative Mechanism is controlled by the three littoral States, 
it fulfils its intention of establishing a mechanism whereby user States and other 
stakeholders can share the burden and cost of enhancing navigational safety in the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Therefore, one could argue the three littoral 
States converted the PMO Secretary-General’s initiative to enhance safety, security 
and environmental protection in the Straits into a mechanism to implement article 




The three cases of ASEAN-wide cooperation in countering piracy in its waters 
are ReCAAP, which is “the most comprehensive regional anti-piracy institution so 
far” (Loewen in Hofmeister and Rueppel, 2014: 16). Therefore, the ReCAAP is 
positioned in the category of high commitment levels. Second is the AMF, which 
belongs to the medium commitment category, as it is a dialogue forum. The third 
initiative is ASCAP, which is classified as a low commitment mechanism, since it is 
an intergovernmental statement. 




All of the aforementioned six cases are believed to provide a representative 
sample of the maritime security architecture of ASEAN in the subregional-regional 
nexus perspective. By testing all the selected cases against the hypotheses, it is 
possible to test the falsification of the claims made by the hypotheses. The cases are 
deliberately chosen to represent a wide array of anti-piracy mechanisms, ranging 
from the prominent ones, like MSP to the lesser-known and perhaps more mundane 
ones, like ASCAP. With this in mind, conclusions on the subregionalism-regionalism 
relationship based on these six cases help elucidate the causal mechanisms and 












The thesis is organised as follows: The following chapter provides an 
overview of the literature on maritime security in ASEAN, the diverse scholarly 
perspectives on Southeast Asian regionalism and its interplay with bilateral and 
subregional cooperation. It also positions this research into a body of literature on 




Chapters III and IV test the empirical expectations under the four points of 
contention in the region-divergent hypothesis (H1) and two points of contention in the 
region-convergent hypothesis (H2) respectively. In these chapters, the three 
selected cases of subregional and regional cooperation are juxtaposed against the 
falsifiable claims made by each of the hypotheses. 
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Chapter V summarises the theoretical framework and case study findings. In 
addition, it discusses the limitations of the research, as well as presenting 
recommendations for the direction of future research in this topic area.
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The body of literature dealing with maritime piracy in the Strait of Malacca and 
the causal relationship between subregionalism and regionalism in ASEAN is 
exceptionally narrow. Therefore, this literature review focuses on discussing a wider 
range of literature dealing with maritime security issues in the regionalist perspective. 
In addition, the objective of this chapter is to position the research into a body of 
literature and to identify existing gaps that the thesis seeks to fill out. The body of 
literature relevant to this research can broadly be divided into several categories: 
literature dealing with maritime security and sea piracy in Southeast Asia, literature 
studying the relationship between bilateralism (subregionalism) and multilateralism 
(or regionalism), literature viewing bilateralism (subregionalism) as the preferred 
mode of cooperation, and literature claiming that multilateralism (regionalism) is 




The issue of maritime piracy is found under the rubrics of non-traditional 
security (NTS). Therefore, there is a wide body of literature on NTS, where maritime 
piracy is only one topic among the plethora of NTS issues. Among these, the 
noteworthy publications are by Caballero-Anthony (2013), Collins (2000), Hoadley 
and Ruland (2006), Lovell (2003), and Tan and Acharya (2004). Literature 
specifically dealing with maritime piracy is limited and standalone works on piracy in 
the Strait of Malacca perhaps include only one book: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and 
Securing the Malacca Straits by G.G. Ong-Webb (2006). Therefore, it can be
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In reviewing literary works on maritime piracy in the Strait of Malacca, book 
chapters and journal articles represent a richer outlet of resources. Maritime piracy in 
the Strait of Malacca often appears as a subsection or a chapter in books on 
maritime crimes in general or in Southeast Asia specifically. The most 
comprehensive book to date is the Piracy and International Maritime Crimes in 
ASEAN: Prospects for Cooperation by Beckerman and Roach (2012). Although this 
book mostly tackles the legal dimension of the piracy problem, it provides an 
excellent analysis of the Malacca Strait situation, with Chapters 3, 4 and 5 directly 




Due to the rapid developments in counter-piracy measures in Southeast Asia, 
information in publications quickly becomes obsolete and more recent books are 
preferred. However, the pace at which new analytical publications on piracy in 
ASEAN are issued does not keep up with the pace of new developments regarding 
the issue. Therefore, older publications can also be of value in providing insightful 
analyses of piracy in the region. Maritime Security in Southeast Asia by Kwa and 
Skogan (2007) is believed to be one of the landmark publications on the Malacca 
Strait piracy issue, taking an all-encompassing approach of positioning the issue in 
the regional and global perspective. Another useful contribution to the issue of sea 
piracy within ASEAN is Ralf Emmers’ Comprehensive Security and Resilience in 
Southeast Asia: ASEAN's Approach to Terrorism and Sea Piracy (2007). Since this
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book scrutinises the national-regional nexus in tackling sea piracy, it forms a 




Sea piracy in the Strait of Malacca is used but as a case study to elucidate the 
subregionalism-regionalism causal relationship in Southeast Asia. The second 
branch of literature this thesis is related to examines this very relationship. The 
following paragraphs present two academic camps. The first camp refers to literature 
that regards bilateralism as the preferred mode of cooperation in ASEAN. A 
competing academic camp suggests that regional approaches to maritime security 
are on the rise. There is also a noteworthy pool of scholars that are reluctant to make 
any conclusive judgements on the relationship between subregionalism and 
regionalism is difficult. It is precisely due to these deep divisions that this thesis 
positions itself in the heart of this debate. It is hoped that the academic literature on 
the bilateralism, multilateralism and regionalism in ASEAN can be synthesised to 
form a theoretical backbone for researching whether subregional approaches to 





In general, Southeast Asian scholars tend to suggest that bilateralism is the 
preferred mode of cooperation among ASEAN states. Their reasoning claims that 
increases in bilateral cooperation do not bolster greater regional cooperation. On the 
contrary, scholars like Acharya (1990, 2009), Bradford (2008), Raymond in Elleman 
et al. (2010), Katsumata (2003), and Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) claim that 
greater bilateralism has a repressive (region-divergent) effect on the emergence of 
regional institutionalist and legislative frameworks in ASEAN. For instance, Raymond
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points out that though “user states and shippers have been willing to support some 
of these projects on a bilateral basis, there is little interest in any long term 
institutionalization of the process” (in Simon, 2010: 28). Hemmer and Katzenstein 
make an important observation based on the US interaction with Asia, highlighting 
that while “with its North Atlantic partners, the United States preferred to operate on 
a multilateral basis…with its Southeast Asian partners, in contrast, the United States 
preferred to operate bilaterally” (2002: 575). The rationale for these claims draws 
upon various schools of International Relations, but roughly mirrors the neo-realist 
branch. The theoretical explanation behind why bilateralism or subregionalism might 
be preferred is summed up in Dent’s (2006) account on region-divergent bilateralism 
explained in the Hypotheses section of this thesis. Drawing upon these sentiments, 
there is an extensive body of literature that shares strong doubts regarding the 




Perceptions expressing a more favourable view of ASEAN’s role in 
securitising its waters constitute an antithetical branch to the literature described 
above. Although this academic camp counts fewer enthusiasts, there are authors 
suggesting that bilateralism can form foundations for multilateralism to develop. 
Among these scholars are Huang (2008), Valencia (2000) and Heller (2005). 
Acharya made a daring prediction 24 years ago, suggesting that there is “willingness 
of ASEAN leaders to ‘think the unthinkable’: a multilateral ASEAN security 
framework” (1990: 1). Nowadays, a multilateral ASEAN security framework does not 
appear unthinkable and indeed the academia is growing increasingly optimistic about 
the role of ASEAN. For instance, Valencia also allows for the possibility of bilateral 
cooperation overflowing into regional institutional frameworks. He suggests that
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“although it depends on the issue, there are several general reasons why 
multilateralism can be preferable to bilateralism” (Valencia, 2000: 226). The 
argument carries on to claim that states may enjoy the economic benefits of 
multilateral institutions as compared to a dense web of bilateral agreements, as well 
as the capability of multilateral mechanisms to pacify bilateral disputes (Valencia, 
2000: 226). Authors like Heller (2005) also perceive bilateralism and multilateralism 
as mutually-inclusive processes that complement each other. Sentiments expressing 
a favourable view of the role of ASEAN in security cooperation generally stem from 
neoliberal institutionalist International Relations theories. The theoretical rationale for 
preferring regional multilateral frameworks is summed up in Dent’s elucidation of 
region-convergent bilateralism. In general, as ASEAN moves closer to concluding its 
ASEAN Community 2015, literature expressing optimistic outlooks for regional 




To date, the only complete book dealing with the aforementioned nexus in 
Southeast Asian context is International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between 
Bilateralism and Multilateralism by Ganesan and Amer (2010). The authors in their 
conclusion claim that “bilateralism is a well-established policy response in Southeast 
Asian international relations” (p.327), but also that “in many instances, bilateralism 
preceded the onset of multilateralism in Southeast Asia” (p.328). As seen from these 
statements, the book is inconclusive on the issue of whether bilateralism or 
subregionalism begets multilateralism or regionalism. Inconclusiveness concerning 
the region-divergent or region-convergent effect of bilateralism is a common theme 
when surveying the literature. Even Dent in his article assumes that “we should 
preface any conclusive judgements on which of these two conceptual approaches
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best defines the current and future prospects of the bilateralism–regionalism 
relationship in Southeast Asia” (Dent, 2006: 109).  It is precisely this 
inconclusiveness in literature that this thesis seeks to elucidate. 
 
Jayasuriya ‘s article on regionalism offers salient observations on the 
interesting dynamics between bilateralism, sub-regionalism and regionalism 
at large. His theory suggests that “prevailing theories of regional cooperation 
in the Asia Pacific fail to pay due heed to the manner in which regional 
integration is rooted in domestic coalitions, economic strategies, and state 
forms that prevailed in the boom years of the ‘Asian Miracle’” (Jayasuriya, 
2003: 199). As such and in agreement with this theory, domestic milieus of 





Christopher Dent is one of the only scholars who examine the nexus between 
economic bilateralism and ASEAN-led regionalism. He scrutinised the “emergence of 
a Singapore - Thailand bilateral axis or alliance on matters of Southeast Asian 
economic regionalism” (Dent, 2006: 81). No study to date has attempted to explain 
subregionalism and its implications for Southeast Asian security regionalism. In the 
same vein, no published research has examined this causal relationship using 
maritime piracy in the Strait of Malacca as a case study. Measures countering 
maritime piracy in the Malacca Strait are mainly examined for their value in 
assessing the global to regional to unilateral legal instruments, UNCLOS to MLAT 
and beyond (prominently in Beckman and Roach, 2012). This thesis adapts Dent’s 
analytical framework to maritime piracy relations in Southeast Asia. The research 
- 44 -  
inquiry of this thesis is thus unique insofar as this literature review is concerned. In 
addition, many of the authors like Dent (2006) or Ganesan and Amer (2010) only 
look at bilateralism. There is a lack of academic attention to subregionalism, as in the 
case of the littoral states in the Strait of Malacca. Similarly, scholars tend to overlook 
the subregional dynamics within ASEAN. Scrutinising subregionalism and linking 
intra-ASEAN relations to maritime piracy are vastly understudied research domains. 
Therefore, this thesis seeks to fill out the prominent gaps in literature that helps to 
shed light on the subregional-regional relationship in ASEAN’s maritime security 
architecture.
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Trilateral cooperation in the Strait of Malacca has shown that, when faced 
with a common issue, the affected states can prove to be highly capable in 
developing effective counter-piracy mechanisms. The interests of the three littoral 
states converged around the notion of a common threat. The cooperation has been 
so successful that it’s sometimes referred to as a “’Malacca model’ and it is being 
applied for counter-piracy efforts in other parts of the world, including the Horn of 




The three selected cases of subregional cooperation in countering piracy in 
the Malacca Strait are the MSP, the Cooperative Mechanism and the Batam 
Statement. They form a representative sample of the subregional anti-piracy 




In Chapter I, four falsifiable claims were introduced to test the region- 
divergent hypothesis and two principles to test the region-convergent hypothesis. 
These claims are called, according to Dent, points of contention: 1) the undermining 
and capturing effect, 2) intensifying bilateralism (subregionalism) and regional inter- 
state rivalry, 3) reinforced power asymmetries, and 4) multi-speed subregionalism 
and the development divide. Under the region-convergent division (Hypothesis 2), 
there are two points of contention: 1) sub-structural or ‘latticed’ foundation, and 2) 
congruent processes and objectives.
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Hypothesis-testing of Subregional Mechanisms 













































































































1) Sub-structural or 
‘Latticed’ Foundation 
Failed to 


























































As shown, the selected cases of subregional cooperation falsify the claims 
made under the region-divergent hypothesis. This is predominantly due to the 
absence of indicators supporting the empirical expectations made by each claim. On 
the other hand, the cases suggest that the region-convergent hypothesis is failed to 
be falsified by the subregional cases, mostly due to the presence of empirical 
expectations stemming from each point of contention.
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To understand how these conclusions have been reached, the following 
paragraphs present an analysis of each of the selected cases of subregional anti- 
piracy cooperation against the points of contention. First, all the points of contention 
and their empirical expectations are outlined in terms of falsifiable empirical 






Hypothesis 1: Sub-regional cooperation is region-divergent to regional 
integration. 
 





Dent has argued that “intensified bilateralism may undermine the integrity or 
capture key aspects of regional organizations, including their regional economic 
projects” (Dent, 2006: 86). In other words, this effect is created when the actions and 
objectives of sub-regional cooperation start to dominate or destabilise those integral 
to the regional organisation, in this case, to ASEAN. To adapt this point to the cases 
examined, this point contends that intensified subregionalism may undermine the 
integrity or capture key aspects of ASEAN, including their regional security projects. 
Therefore, the empirical expectation under this point is that subregionalism in the 
Strait of Malacca dominates or destabilises regional security endeavours in ASEAN. 
Furthermore, this point claims that subregional mechanisms would need to be so 
robust and efficient that any attempts at coordinating a pan-regional counter-piracy 
initiative would be unnecessary. This point is falsified if there are indicators 
suggesting convergence and mutual reinforcement of subregional cooperation with
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the overall trajectory of ASEAN’s security mechanisms. In the absence of such 










This point states that “deepening bilateralism within a region can create 
increasingly convoluted patterns of reactive counter-balancing maneuvers amongst 
the region’s constituent states, leading to potentially hazardous inter-state rivalry” 
(Dent, 2006: 86). The effect describes destructive inter-state rivalry that not only 
hinders the cultivation, but promotes the deterioration of regional partnerships. To 
adapt this point to the case of subregional anti-piracy cooperation in the Strait of 
Malacca, the analysis looks at deepening subregionalism within ASEAN and its 
effect on the development of reactive counter-balancing maneuvers. Since 
eradicating maritime piracy is in the wider interest of the region, it is not obvious how 
a reactive counter-balancing amongst the region’s constituent states transpires. 
Rather, what this point of contention highlights, in the context of this research inquiry, 
is the inter-state rivalry. This issue only emerges if maritime security is seen in a 
zero-sum neorealist perspective. In this way, the Strait of Malacca deepening 
subregionalism has the potential to threaten the maritime interests of other ASEAN 
member states. An example can be given based on the logic of the first mover 
advantage, where the involved parties are able to take advantage of claiming 
achievements in eradicating maritime piracy. This can lead to increased international 
attention and subsequent backing from the global maritime powers. Under this logic, 
increasing subregionalism has the potential to impede ASEAN’s regional efforts at 
advancing a multilateral apparatus to fight maritime piracy in Southeast Asia. This
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point can be falsified if the evidence suggests that the deepening subregionalism in 










The third point of contention brings forth the notion that “unchecked 
bilateralism serves to further exaggerate or reinforce power asymmetries within a 
region, which in turn may work against regional community-building” (Dent, 2006: 
86). To explain, economically advanced states with greater maritime capabilities 
often avoid the scrutiny of the regional organisation of which they are members. 
These states further attract resources and engage in synergetic deals that 
disadvantage the rest of the regional grouping. Such power asymmetries discourage 
regional integration for the mutual suspicion of smaller states being dominated by 
more robust members. To adapt this to the case of subregionalism in the Strait of 
Malacca, the empirical expectation is to witness unchecked subregionalism serving 
to further exaggerate power asymmetries within ASEAN. Unchecked subregionalism 
denotes actions that avoid the scrutiny of ASEAN and upset regional balances. 
There are inevitably certain power asymmetries within ASEAN, however this point is 
concerned with whether the subregional cooperation reinforces these asymmetries 
further. Additional empirical indicators include arm-flexing of the littoral states and 
displays of their naval capabilities in order to intimidate the rest of the ASEAN 
community. It is important to look for indicators suggesting that the littoral states’ 
naval power is used in an irresponsive manner to manipulate the balance in the 
ASEAN community. This point can be falsified with evidence suggesting that the
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littoral states did not abuse their dominant position via the anti-piracy mechanisms at 












The last point of contention under the region-divergent hypothesis argues that 
“multi-speed economic bilateralism may exacerbate the existing development divide 
within a regional organization” (Dent, 2006: 86). Under this point, it is important to 
look at what particular benefits are created as a result of a subregional action and 
how these benefits are distributed. If there are welfare, economic, opportunity, 
security, social or other benefits created, it is important to analyse whether these are 
to be enjoyed exclusively by the parties involved, or whether these are to be shared 
among the regional grouping. The empirical expectation under this point is that the 
subregionalism in the Strait of Malacca benefits only the littoral states. Divergent 
degrees of development across the region hinder regional cooperation, as state 
interests and objectives have various priorities based on their level of development. 
With deepening economic divides, it is more difficult to coordinate a shared vision of 
the region’s trajectory. Multi-speed subregionalism has the effect of working against 
the overarching objective of community-building. In the context of anti-piracy 
measures in the Strait of Malacca, this means that if the littoral states reaped 
significant benefits from their cooperation, ASEAN would be less interested in 
developing a region-wide approach to piracy. Moreover, the littoral states would be 
less interested in joining such initiatives, since they would be disadvantaged in the 
cost-benefit calculation. This point of contention is falsifiable by evidence pointing out
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that the benefits gained by countering piracy in the Strait of Malacca were shared by 















Under the rubrics of region-convergent subregionalism, Dent offers two points 
of contention. The first one describes an argument named the ‘latticed foundation’, 
which claims that “bilateralism may provide a sub-structural or ‘latticed’ foundation 
for regionalism to develop” (Dent, 2006: 84). In the context of subregional 
cooperation in the Strait of Malacca, this point is adapted to describe subregionalism 
acting as a sub-structural or ‘latticed’ foundation for ASEAN maritime security 
regionalism to develop. The logics of this argument state that, due to created 
synergies, regionally-coordinated mechanisms are more viable than a web of 
subregional arrangements. The empirical expectations put forth by this point are 
indicated by the formation of a regional arrangement after a period of intensified 
subregional cooperation. This point can be falsified if evidence shows the lack of 
regional cooperative mechanisms despite the presence of a dense network of 
subregional apparatus.
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The second, and the last, point of contention under the region-convergent 
hypothesis brings forth the notion of “congruent processes and objectives, whereby 
bilateralism and regionalism may be involved in serving similar ends, and even 
working in concert with the other” (Dent, 2006: 85). As Dent highlights, this point is 
concerned with a process rather than a structure. The processes under each 
counter-piracy initiative need to be aligned with wider objectives of ASEAN. Only 
when there is a convergence of goals and aims in subregional and regional 
mechanisms can subregional mechanisms be region-convergent. It is also possible 
for this to be seen in terms of the two sets of mechanisms being mutually 
complementary, or working in concert with one another. The empirical expectation 
for both subregional and regional initiatives is to have similar goals and objectives. 
This point can be falsified if their objectives point at divergent angles or even 




Now that all the points of contention under both hypotheses have been 
outlined in terms of falsifiability and their empirical expectations, the chapter follows 
with an analysis of the subregional cases of anti-piracy cooperation against the 
abovementioned claims. The analysis is built around cases to determine whether 
these cases provide enough empirical support for either of the hypotheses.
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The MSP did not seem to dominate ASEAN’s regional agenda. When it was 
introduced in July 2004, the ASEAN Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum were not 
discussing issues of maritime safety. It needs to be pointed out that the MSP was a 
largely successful project that effectively eradicated piracy from the region, as seen 
by the sharp drop in the number of piracy attacks in 2005. At this time, ASEAN did 
not seem to react to the issue. MSP was largely a subregional project between the 
littoral states, which was later joined by Thailand. Although the motivations and goals 
were consistent between ASEAN and the subregion, arrangements like the MSP 
would not have been possible to realise on a pan-ASEAN level. This is due to the 
lack of confidence-building and trust between certain members of the regional 
grouping, especially those involved in territorial disputes. Also, MSP necessitated 
concessions on sovereignty on the part of the littoral states, such as in cases of hot 
pursuit. This would have been vastly difficult to negotiate among all the ASEAN 
members. Thus the evidence from the MSP points to a direction that the empirical 
expectation under the undermining and capturing effect is not fulfilled. Even when 
taking into account the success of MSP as a robust and efficient counter-piracy 
initiative, it cannot be said that any further ASEAN-led initiative would be redundant. 
In other words, the MSP project neither seems to have dominated ASEAN-wide 
initiatives, nor destabilised them. The empirical expectations under the first point of 
contention in the region-divergent hypothesis are not met. Therefore, it is claimed 
that the MSP does not support the logic of the undermining and capturing effect, as 
outlined above.
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Regarding the intensifying subregionalism and regional inter-state rivalry, 
evidence seems to suggest that rather than engaging in inter-state rivalry, the 
ASEAN member states joined the efforts put forth by the littoral states. Thailand 
became a member of MSSP in October 2008 and EiS in January 2009. Other 
ASEAN member states engaged in the spin-off faction of the MSP - the data 
network, also labelled MSP Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG). The goal of IEG is to 
share sensitive information in the Strait of Malacca as well as to establish a 
surveillance system to patrol the Strait. This is utilised to exchange information over 
the Internet Data Centre in Singapore. This Centre is also called the Malacca Straits 
Patrols Information System (MSP-IS) and facilitates data exchange and coordination 
between the participants. The inclusiveness of these initiatives is a reason why 
similar (perhaps competitive) anti-piracy mechanisms did not emerge elsewhere in 
the region. It should be pointed out that due to the success of MSP, the littoral states 
were given international recognition. However, the first mover advantage did not 
result in an increase of a foreign aid, as the “littoral states bordering the Strait of 
Malacca, appear quite resistant to advanced foreign intervention in regional security 
regime building at this moment” (Tseng in Hofmeister and Rueppel, 2014: 100). 
Therefore, the success of MSP did not give a reason to other ASEAN member states 
to engage in watchful jealousy and counter-balance the littoral states’ efforts. This 
gives enough evidence to support the falsification of the reactive counter-balancing 
argument. The empirical indicators presented by the second point of contention 





Testing the third point of contention, reinforced power asymmetries, the MSP 
 
does not exhibit the presence of its empirical expectations. Subregional cooperation
- 55 -  
enjoys a relative autonomy from the structures of ASEAN. While the former 
MALSINDO scheme of coordinated patrols in the Strait of Malacca was heavily 
influenced by ASEAN’s underlying principle of non-intervention, today the EiS 
aeroplanes could enter up to three nautical miles (nm) into the twelve-nm territorial 
water zone of the adjacent participating state. This suggests that subregional 
cooperation can break from the principles of the regional grouping within which it 
takes place. Such practices might be labelled as ‘unchecked subregionalism’. Yet 
instead of a hard power approach, the littoral states seem to exercise a form of a soft 
power. The littoral states try to lead the region by example and showcase best 
practices to anti-piracy mechanisms. This is also the reason why many of the 
subsequent counter-piracy initiatives are modelled after the MSP scheme. Also, by 
advocating the best practice principles, the littoral states may be regarded to secure 
their position in the maritime security realm. However, this should not be seen in the 
realpolitik terms, as the littoral states never expressed a desire to dominate the 
region using the MSP initiative. In real terms, the littoral states do not gain any 
practical political leverage in negotiations by implementing programmes such as the 
MSP. It is fair to suggest that the littoral states under the MSP did exercise their 
powers in a responsible manner, not endangering their regional partners. Therefore, 
the MSP seems to provide insufficient evidence in support of the third point of 




The MSP initiative does not seem to have a dividing effect on the economies 
of ASEAN. Considering the fourth point of contention under the region-divergent 
hypothesis, the littoral states and other ASEAN members most likely benefitted 
equally from the eradication of sea piracy from the Strait of Malacca. Most of the
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ASEAN member states depend on the uninterrupted flow of goods along the sea 
lines of communication. Therefore, the increased safety in this important maritime 
chokepoint would economically benefit all of the ASEAN member states. It is 
reasonable to argue that all the ASEAN members have an equal stake in securitising 
the Strait and the welfare gains were distributed. Thus regional community-building 
should not have been hampered as a result of the actions taken under the MSP 
project. It can be claimed that countering piracy in the Strait of Malacca has a benefit 
to all ASEAN members. The MSP mechanism does not put other ASEAN subregions 
in a disadvantaged position. Although, it has to be pointed out that the experiences 
in the Strait of Malacca do lead to a multi-speed subregionalism. This is because the 
technological expertise and financial aid targeted to anti-piracy mechanisms were 
concentrated mainly in the Strait of Malacca region. Singapore has provided most of 
the financial support for the MSP programme, leaving other regions infested with 
piracy, like Sulawesi Island or the South China Sea, poorly equipped to counter this 
issue. To a certain degree, the MSP did result in a deeper development divide within 
the region. However, testing for the empirical expectations, the MSP shows lack of 
evidence to support this claim. The stronger argument here is that the entire region 
benefitted equally from eradicating sea piracy from the region, thus bolstering the 
regional community-building exercise. Therefore, the fourth point of contention is 




Continuing with testing the latticed foundation argument under the region- 
convergent hypothesis, it is clear that the scope of the MSP expanded since its 
inception. As the MSP proved to be effective in eradicating sea piracy in the Strait of 
Malacca (with a drop of 57 attacks in 2004 to 23 attacks in 2005), more resources
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were invested into this mechanism to bolster its efficiency. Even though the Strait of 
Malacca is predominantly bordered by the three littoral states, Thailand decided to 
join. This demonstrates the inclusive and transparent character of the MSP 
mechanism. Therefore, it can be claimed that the subregional cooperation under the 
MSP has been fairly dense and rather broad. It may not be a coincidence that 
arguably the most comprehensive regional cooperative mechanism, ReCAAP, has 
been implemented in 2006. This development came two years after the 
establishment of MSP and one year after the deployment of EiS aerial surveillance. 
The ReCAAP is likely to be ASEAN’s response to the successes in the Strait of 
Malacca, namely the MSP as the most influential mechanism. Also, the AMF has 
been founded two years after Thailand joined the MSSP and one year after it joined 
the EiS. This provides further evidence in support of the argument that regional 
cooperative mechanisms are based on a dense web of subregional arrangements. 
The MSP is believed to have been instrumental in the adoption of region-wide anti- 
piracy mechanisms. Therefore, insofar as the empirical expectations under this point 
find support in the MSP mechanism, it can be claimed that this point cannot be 
falsified. In other words, in the presence of indicators suggesting that the MSP has 
formed the latticed foundation for wider region-wide mechanisms to develop, this 




Lastly, the second point of contention under the region-convergent 
hypothesis, congruent processes and objectives, is tested. The overall objective 
under the MSP initiative is to eradicate piracy from the Strait of Malacca to guarantee 
safety of passage to all vessels crossing the Strait. The objectives of the MSP 
primarily concern security. As it has been argued above, the MSP has debatably
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sparked off the ReCAAP initiative. Therefore, it makes sense to examine the 
objectives of ReCAAP to determine whether they align with those presented by the 
MSP. ReCAAP “is the first regional government-to-government agreement to 
promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia” 
(ReCAAP, 2014, online). As shown, both mechanisms are primarily concerned with 
security, protecting the marine environment from maritime piracy. This provides 
strong evidence in support of the congruent processes and objectives argument. It is 
indeed probable that the MSP mechanism has inspired the adoption of the ReCAAP, 
as their objectives align. Therefore, in the presence of indicators, the congruent 











The Co-operative Mechanism on Safety of Navigation and Environmental 
Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was first presented as an idea at 
Kuala Lumpur in 2006 at the IMO-sponsored meeting between the littoral and user 
states of the Strait of Malacca. Embracing the principles enshrined in UNCLOS, the 
Cooperative Mechanism also reflects regional agreements like the Kuala Lumpur 
Statement, the Jakarta Statement and the Batam Statement. It is clear that the 
Cooperative Mechanism was designed to align with the wider ASEAN objectives. 
Unlike in the case of the right to hot pursuit in MSP, the Cooperative Mechanism is 
premised on principles of sovereignty and territoriality, reaffirming that “sovereignty 
and primary responsibility over navigational safety and environmental protection in 
the Straits lies with the littoral States” (Cooperative Mechanism, 2014, online). This 
mechanism was predominantly designed to tackle the security threats and
- 59 -  
navigational safety in the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, the Cooperative Mechanism 
does not concern maritime territories beyond the Strait. This mechanism did not 
aspire to compete with ASEAN-led maritime cooperative mechanisms. Hence, there 
is an absence of indicators suggesting that the Cooperative Mechanism dominates 
or destabilises region-wide attempts at promoting maritime security. It can be said 
that the Cooperative Mechanism, just as the MSP, does not support claims made 




It is unlikely that the Cooperative Mechanism would trigger a counter- 
balancing effect on the part of the other ASEAN members, as it is based on 
international and regional agreements endorsed by all the ASEAN member states. 
The Cooperative Mechanism was established according to article 43 of UNCLOS, 
stating that it “provides an opportunity to co-operate, contribute and play a role in 
maintaining and enhancing the safety of navigation and protection of the marine 
environment in the Straits which is of strategic importance for regional and global 
trade” (Chalermpalanupap and Ibanez in Beckerman and Roach, 2012: 155-156). 
Recognising its strategic importance, it would be unreasonable for the other ASEAN 
states to jeopardise the Mechanism. To date, no such a mechanism exists in place in 
other parts of Southeast Asia. This suggests that the Cooperative Mechanism 
neither triggered inter-state rivalry, nor counter-balancing exercises. This can also be 
attributed to the confidence that other ASEAN member states possess in the 
international maritime law, like UNCLOS, based on which the Cooperative 
Mechanism operates. Therefore, it can be claimed that the Cooperative Mechanism 
falsifies the intensifying subregionalism argument, since there are no indicators 
exhibiting its empirical expectations.
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The Cooperative Mechanism, as stated earlier, is an open-ended mechanism 
that seeks to protect the marine environment and safety of passage in the Strait of 
Malacca. It provides a cooperative framework for the littoral states, user states and 
other stakeholders like the shipping industry, to “participate and share the 
responsibility of maintaining and enhancing the safety of navigation and protection of 
the marine environment in the Straits” (Cooperative Mechanism, 2014, online). By 
involving the Strait users and stakeholders, the Cooperative Mechanism does not fall 
outside of the checks and balances of the regional groupings. Also, the Mechanism 
was launched as a result of a series of IMO-organised meetings that were focused 
on recognising the strategic importance of the Strait and the need for promoting safe 
and free passage to all ships. Being based on the proceedings of IMO, it is unlikely 
that the littoral states utilise the Mechanism to distort the power balance within the 
region. This arrangement seems to mitigate any attempts at unchecked 
subregionalism. Indeed, regarding regional community-building, the Mechanism 
appears to be one of the leading examples of how open-ended and inclusive 
apparatus may contribute to region-wide involvement centred on a common issue. 
Therefore, in the absence of evidence suggesting that the Cooperative Mechanism 
might have had an effect of reinforcing the regional power asymmetries, the third 




The three main components of the Cooperative Mechanism include: 1) the 
Cooperation Forum that acts as a platform for the littoral states and other 
stakeholders to discuss issues of common interests; 2) the Project Coordination 
Committee that oversees the implementation of projects aimed at promoting 
navigational safety and environmental protection, as directed by the Cooperation
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Forum; and 3) the Aids to Navigation Fund, which is funded by the global maritime 
community to finance the maintenance of marine navigational aids in the Malacca 
Strait. The Cooperative Mechanism seems to cater only for the needs of the Strait of 
Malacca. Whereas the MSP programme did not take contributions from the global 
maritime community, the Cooperative Mechanism’s third component “Aids to 
Navigation Fund” does. This can present an opportunity cost, resulting in less funds 
for other ASEAN regions also crippled by maritime piracy. In this way, the attention 
and subsequent aid provided by the international community is centred on the Strait 
of Malacca. This may indeed result in deepening the development divide within the 
region. Although the eradication of piracy from the Strait benefits all ASEAN 
members, the donations are made only towards the littoral states. It can be 
suggested that these indicators support the empirical expectation of this point. The 
Cooperative Mechanism and its effect on maritime security regionalism can be 
considered divisive. The evidence from the Cooperative Mechanism seems to 





Turning to region-convergent arguments, the establishment of the 
Cooperative Mechanism comes one year after the successful ReCAAP, but two 
years prior to the significant inaugural AMF. It is suggested that Cooperative 
Mechanism also contributed to the establishments of region-wide anti-piracy 
initiatives, like the adoption of the ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint or the ARF ISM 
on Maritime Security. The latter is especially significant, insofar as the Cooperative 
Mechanism and its activities span beyond the littoral states. Its foundations found in 
the IMO proceedings and its funding coming from the wider marine community (as
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described above), it can be claimed that the Cooperative Mechanism had an impact 
on wider regional groupings, like the ARF. This also provides additional evidence in 
support of the causal logic claiming that a web of subregional arrangements 
precedes the onset of regional arrangements. Thus the Cooperative Mechanism also 





As stated above, the Cooperative Mechanism’s aim is to put into operation 




“Navigational and safety aids and other improvements and the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution. 
User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement cooperate: 
 
(a) in the establishment and maintenance in a strait of necessary navigational 
and safety aids or other improvements in aid of international navigation; and 
(b) for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships.” 
 




The Cooperative Mechanism is not only concerned with maritime piracy, but 
attempts to be a comprehensive and all-encompassing mechanism to tackle a wide 
array of maritime issues. As the Cooperative Mechanism was primarily compared to 
the AMF in the previous section, it is useful to now compare and contrast the 
objectives of this Forum. Bateman and Chan summarise the goals of the AMF as a 
forum “that would exchange ideas not only on maritime security issues but also on 
other broad, cross-cutting issues, such as the protection of the marine environment, 
illegal fishing, smuggling and maritime transportation” (in Hofmeister and Rueppel,
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2014: 70). This is remarkably similar to the aims and objectives of the Cooperative 
Mechanism. Both of the initiatives aim to encompass a wide array of maritime 
issues. Therefore, as the evidence suggests, their objectives are indeed congruent. 
This fulfils the empirical expectations of the last point of contention under the region- 
convergent hypothesis. Therefore, in the presence of indicators that falsify this claim, 











The Batam Joint Statement of the 4th Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the 
Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (The Batam Statement) and 






“The Ministers acknowledged that the littoral States should address the issue of 
maritime security comprehensively which includes trans-boundary crimes such as 
piracy, armed robbery and terrorism. The Ministers also recognized the need to 
address the issue of trafficking in persons, and smuggling of people, weapons and 
other trans-boundary crimes through appropriate mechanisms.” 
 






The Statements was signed in August 2005 between the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. It was a reaction to the 
deteriorating piracy situation in the Strait of Malacca, which experienced its peak in
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2004 with 57 incidents of maritime piracy. The purpose of the Statement was to 
ensure the international maritime community of the littoral states’ intent to take solid 
steps against piracy and safety of navigation in the Strait. This was especially 
needed after Lloyds categorised the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a high risk 
zone for piracy and terrorism. The Batam statement is an example of an initiative 
with a low impact level. Therefore, it lacks the capability of either dominating or 
destabilising ASEAN-wide maritime security apparatus. In the same vein, it cannot 
be claimed that the Batam Statement was such a comprehensive agreement as to 
make any further ASEAN-led initiatives in this direction unnecessary. Overall, the 
Batam Statement does not support the logics outlined under the undermining and 
capturing effect argument of region-divergent hypothesis, as the indicators for the 




Although the Batam Statement has only a limited influence, a concrete 
measure that resulted from the Statement was the establishment of the Tripartite 
Technical Expert Group (TTEG) on Maritime Security. The TTEG has been 
established exclusively between the Strait of Malacca littoral states and continues to 
serve the interests of its founders. In other words, the TTEG has not been set up to 
welcome further participation from the region. This might indicate the fragmentation 
of the regional marine community. Nevertheless, the Batam Statement and TTEG 
did not spark off a regional response. In the absence of indicators suggesting that 
the Batam Statement triggered a reactive counter-balancing of the wider ASEAN 
community, this mechanism seems to falsify the claims made by the second point of 
contention under region-divergent hypothesis.
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Even though the Batam Statement did not open up to the participation of other 
regional members, the Statement was based on the regional norms and principles, 
collectively known as the ASEAN way. Therefore, the Batam Statement was also 
subjected to the checks and balances of the regional grouping and did not interfere 
with its power politics. Although the Batam Statement led to the establishment of the 
TTEG, it did not have significant leverage on the regional decision-making. The 
littoral states did not seem to utilise the Batam Statement to advance their national 
security interests at the expense of the weaker states. Neither has it appeared that 
the non-participating states were disadvantaged by the Batam Statement, since the 
entire region reaps benefits from the monitoring of maritime piracy in the Strait of 
Malacca. Therefore, as with the MSP and the Cooperative Mechanism, the Batam 
Statement lacks indicators that would play in the interest of the reinforced power 




The Statement did not produce a dividing effect on the economies of 
Southeast Asia, as described under the region-divergent hypothesis’ fourth point of 
contention. There was only a limited response from the wider ASEAN community to 
the developments under the Batam Statement. Although the Batam Statement was 
only an agreement between the littoral states, it lacked the impact to attract enough 
financial aid to exacerbate the development divide within the region. There is a lack 
of evidence suggesting that the Batam Statement would have had the effect of 
deepening the development divide within ASEAN.
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Examining the region-convergent arguments, the Batam Statement has been 
signed in the same year as the EiS initiative was launched, in 2005. Therefore, 
similar arguments apply as in the case of MSP. However, it has to be noted that the 
Batam Statement is an initiative with a low impact on the regional decision-making. 
Hasty conclusions based merely on the sequential logics cannot be made, yet the 
evidence does suggest that the Batam Statement also might have contributed to the 
development of the regional arrangements under ASEAN. For the purpose of this 
analysis, the evidence is, however, not sufficient to fail to falsify the latticed 
foundation argument. With regard to the Batam Statement, the bearing on ASEAN- 




As discussed above, the Batam Statement broadly corresponds with the 
objectives and goals of the AMF. However, whether the Batam Statement influenced 
the agenda of AMF is questionable. Insofar as their objectives are congruent, there 
is an indication suggesting that the empirical expectations of the last point of 
contention under the region-convergent hypothesis are present. Therefore, this point 












As shown above, none of the three scrutinised cases of subregional 
cooperation, the MSP, the Cooperative Mechanism, and the Batam Statement 
exhibit indicators supporting the claims made under the undermining and capturing 
effect point of contention. It is claimed that, due to the lack of evidence and the
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absence of such indicators, the subregional cooperation in the Strait of Malacca 
neither dominated, nor destabilised pan-ASEAN endeavours at securitising the 
region against maritime piracy. The undermining and capturing effect point of 
contention is, for these reasons, considered falsified insofar as subregional 




In addition, none of the cases of subregional cooperation exhibit evidence in 
support of the point of contention stating that deepening subregionalism can create 
convoluted patterns of reactive counter-balancing manoeuvres among their regional 
partners. As demonstrated, the MSP and the Cooperative Mechanism were open- 
ended mechanisms that welcomed the participation of the wider ASEAN marine 
community. The Batam Statement, whilst it did not expand to include other members 
beyond the three littoral states, did not have so significant an impact as to trigger a 
regional counter-balancing response. Thus it can be claimed that the three cases of 
subregional cooperation lack the indicators in support of the second point of 
contention. Therefore, based on all three cases unanimously, the second point of 
contention is deemed falsified. This offers greater evidence speaking in favour of 




Regarding the exaggeration or exacerbation of power asymmetries within the 
region, the three cases of subregional cooperation lack indicators under this 
argument. The tests failed to demonstrate that the subregional cooperation has been 
carried out at the expense of other regional partners. Also, the MSP has been shown 
to have been conducted in a responsible manner, not jeopardising the regional 
power balances. The Cooperative Mechanism and the Batam Statement were both
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premised upon the ASEAN principles of non-intervention, consensus and 
 
confidence-building. Therefore, it is fair to claim that the third point of contention, the 
argument of reinforced power asymmetries, has not found sufficient empirical 




The MSP and the Batam Statement do not exhibit indicators suggesting that 
the fourth point of contention’s empirical expectations have backing in the 
subregional cooperation. However, the Cooperative Mechanism, especially its Aids 
to Navigation Fund, does bear similarities to the indicators that denote a certain 
region-divergent effect by deepening the development divide within ASEAN. Yet, due 
to the fact that MSP has a significantly higher impact than the Cooperative 
Mechanism and that the Batam Statement also demonstrated a lack of indicators in 
favour of this point, the fourth point of contention is considered falsified. Overall, the 
entire region of ASEAN seemed to have profited from the eradication of maritime 
piracy from the region and thus the observation implies that the development divides 




With MSP and the Cooperative Mechanism clearly displaying indicators 
suggesting the presence of empirical expectations under the ‘latticed foundation’ 
argument, this analysis cannot falsify this point. The Batam Statement neither rejects 
nor fails to reject this point, due to the lack of evidence on the impact of this initiative 
on the regional maritime security strategies. Therefore, with two cases speaking in 
favour of this point’s validity, especially regarding the sequence of the 
implementation of subregional and regional anti-piracy mechanisms, the first point of 
contention under the region-convergent hypothesis fails to be falsified.
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All of the cases of subregional cooperation exhibit indicators suggesting that 
the arguments made by the second point of contention in the region-convergent 
hypothesis, the congruent processes and objectives argument, have failed to be 
falsified. There is enough evidence in all three cases to demonstrate that their 
objectives and aims are in line with the wider ASEAN maritime strategy goals. Based 
on the three representative cases, it can be claimed that the second point of 
contention provides additional evidence in favour of the region-convergent 




The three representative cases of subregional anti-piracy cooperation 
between the Strait of Malacca littoral states suggest that region-convergent 
outcomes are more likely than region-divergent effects. Evidence from the three 
subregional cases falsifies the empirical expectations derived from the four points of 
contention under the region-divergent hypothesis (hypothesis 1). This is largely due 




On the other hand, the subregional cooperation in the Strait of Malacca 
indicates that region-convergent outcomes are possible. There has been enough 
evidence to support the region-convergent two points of contention. As 
demonstrated, results show that there is a correlation between subregional and 
regional cooperation within ASEAN. The preliminary conclusion states that 
subregional cooperation bolsters region-wide initiatives. Hypothesis 1 has been 
falsified, whereas Hypothesis 2 has failed to be rejected.
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ASEAN’s engagement in regional security affairs has been limited due to its 
principles of non-interference, consensual decision-making and quiet diplomacy. At 
the same time, there is a reluctance among ASEAN members “for the operational 
involvement of non-regional countries in providing security at sea against piracy and 
sea robbery in Southeast Asia” (Bateman and Chan, in Hofmeister and Rueppel, 
2014: 74). Therefore, a regional response to piracy is of growing importance, 
especially since there is no specific regional legal instrument dealing with counter- 
piracy cooperation in Southeast Asia. Even though ASEAN has made considerable 
progress in developing a regional plan to respond to maritime piracy and armed 
robbery, there is an important “need for a unifying mechanism within ASEAN that 
coordinates, facilitates and monitors the implementation of its existing plans and 
programs on piracy and maritime crimes” (Chalermpalanupap and Ibanez in 
Beckman and Roach, 2012: 163). To date, no comprehensive ASEAN-led anti-piracy 
cooperative mechanism has been established, but a few pan-regional mechanisms 




The three selected cases of regional cooperation in countering piracy in 
Southeast Asian waters are ReCAAP, the AMF and ASCAP. The reasons why these 
three cases of region-wide cooperation are considered to be representative are 
explained in Chapter I.
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Similar to the approach adopted in the preceding Chapter, this section 
analyses the claims made by the region-divergent and region-convergent 
hypotheses. The points of contention are adapted to pan-regional anti-piracy 
mechanisms and therefore they slightly differ from the points introduced in the 
previous Chapter. The rationale for this approach lies in the quality of the points of 
contention to test for the effect the subregional cooperation has on regional 
initiatives. However, when testing the regional anti-piracy mechanisms, the points of 
contention need to test the cause of pan-regional initiatives and whether they were 




Given this, the four falsifiable points of contention to test the region-divergent 
hypothesis are: 1) the undermining and capturing cause, 2) counter-balancing 
manoeuvres and regional inter-state rivalry, 3) reinforced power asymmetries, and 4) 
multi-speed regionalism and the development divide. The two point of contention 
under the antithetical region-convergent hypothesis are: 1) a latticed foundation, and 





This Chapter tests the cases of regional cooperation vis-à-vis the falsifiable 
claims made by the points named above. Before presenting the arguments, the table 
here summarises the findings for regional cooperation.
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Hypothesis-testing of Regional Mechanisms 
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From the table, it can be seen that the selected cases of regional cooperation 
falsify all the four points of contention under the region-divergent hypothesis. As it 
was the case with subregional cooperation, this is mainly due to the absence of 
empirical expectations found in the regional cases that would support the region- 
divergent claims. Regarding the region-divergent hypothesis, the evidence from the 
selected region-wide cases proves to be inconclusive, as only one out of the two 
points of contention has failed to be falsified.
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The following paragraphs first introduce all the points of contention under both 
hypotheses alongside expressing their empirical expectations fitted for the region- 
wide cooperative cases. Later, the analysis focuses on the cases themselves, 







Hypothesis 1: Sub-regional cooperation is region-divergent to regional 
integration. 
 





Whereas Dent described the undermining and capturing effect, this needs to 
be adapted to the undermining and capturing cause. This point of contention looks at 
whether the pan-regional anti-piracy cooperation was a response to the subregional 
developments. An empirical expectation under this point is an indicator pointing out 
that regional cooperation has not been halted, dwarfed or overtaken by subregional 
action. In the cases of regional cooperation, this point looks at their relevance to 
determine their role in the plethora of mechanisms deployed to counter piracy in the 
region. This serves to test whether the regional initiatives are robust and efficient 
enough to remain as significant players in ASEAN’s anti-piracy portfolio. The point of 
contention is falsified if evidence suggests that regional cooperation has not brought 
sufficiently significant benefits for ASEAN to retain its support towards them. In such 
a scenario, the subregional initiatives would be the ones to fill out the gap of 
implementing efficient anti-piracy measures. In other words, if there is evidence that 
region-wide cooperation is not performing on par, or better, with the anti-piracy
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cooperative mechanisms deployed at the Strait of Malacca, then there is a reason to 
believe that subregional cooperation has undermined the integrity of ASEAN’s anti- 
piracy action. This would suggest that subregionalism is region-divergent. In the 
absence of such indicators, or if the evidence suggests that regional cooperative 
mechanisms are well-performing, then this serves to reject the first point of 











Similarly to Dent’s argument named “intensifying bilateralism and regional 
inter-state rivalry”, which focused on the effect of subregional cooperation on 
regionalism, this second point of contention transposes the argument to look at its 
cause. Therefore, this second point of contention argues that, if regional anti-piracy 
mechanisms are a counter-balancing reaction to subregionalism, then this goes 
against the region-building process. The subregionalism is then considered to be 
region-divergent. To continue, these developments can have a further deteriorating 
effect on inter-state relations within ASEAN and even lead to inter-state rivalry. The 
empirical expectations under this point are indicators suggesting that the cases of 
regional cooperation serve to counter-balance the anti-piracy initiatives in the Strait 
of Malacca. For instance, the evidence would need to show that one or more of the 
Strait of Malacca littoral states are not parties of the regional cooperative 
mechanisms. Another empirical expectation includes evidence showing that the 
regional cooperation triggered a wave of inter-state rivalry in ASEAN. This point can 
be falsified if evidence from pan-regional cooperation indicates that ASEAN 
attempted to build up on the successful subregional cooperation, rather than to
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counter-balance it. Such evidence needs to be inferred from documents describing 











This point of contention looks at whether the cases of regional cooperation 
stem from asymmetric power relations within ASEAN. Furthermore, this point also 
examines whether the regional anti-piracy mechanisms exacerbate power 
asymmetries within the region, by benefitting certain states at the expense of others. 
To adapt this point to the case of ASEAN regionalism, the empirical expectation is to 
witness divergent levels of commitment in regional mechanisms and to spot free- 
riders. Countries that free-ride on the regional anti-piracy arrangements do not 
possess sufficient political will or economic resources to be fully engaged in the 
regional fight against maritime piracy. Thus these would be considered ‘weaker’ 
states and such a label indicates the power asymmetries in the region. Free-riding 
and divergent levels of commitment go against regional community-building. This 
point can be falsified with evidence suggesting that all ASEAN countries were 
equally committed to the adoption of regional anti-piracy mechanisms. Once in place, 
countries need to uphold their allegiance by demonstrating a sound interest and 
pooling in necessary resources. Under such evidence, this point is considered to be 
falsified.
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The last point of contention under the region-divergent hypothesis is 
concerned with what benefits are created and how they are distributed across the 
ASEAN domain. If regionalism is found to be based on multi-speed subregionalism 
and if it thrives on a development divide, then such practices are deemed to go 
against regional integration. To adapt this point to the case of regional anti-piracy 
cooperation in ASEAN, this test examines indicators suggesting that regional 
cooperation distorts the balance in welfare, economic or social entitlements that 
ASEAN member states enjoy. Since this analysis draws upon a cross-section 
analysis, the role of subregional anti-piracy mechanisms needs to be taken into 
account. The analysis is double-fold; first it focuses on whether regional mechanisms 
stem from unequal, or multi-speed, subregional developments. Second, it scrutinises 
whether the regional mechanisms themselves distribute benefits unequally and thus 
contribute to the deepening divides within the region. To falsify this point, evidence 
would need to suggest that the cases of regional cooperation do not disadvantage 
any particular group of states. Having said this, it is clear that non-maritime states, 
like Laos, would not reap an equal amount of benefits. However, this analysis is 
more concerned with the cost-benefit calculation. Laos might not benefit as much 
from the anti-piracy measures, but it also does not have political, economic or other 
costs towards the mechanisms. Evidence suggesting that benefits created by 
counter-piracy measures are shared by the entire regional grouping would be 
sufficient to falsify the claim made by this point of contention.
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Under the category of region-convergent subregionalism, this analysis adapts 
Dent’s two points of contention to test the developments on a regional level. The 
purpose of these points is predominantly to test whether the selected cases of 
regional cooperation stem from subregionalism in the Strait of Malacca. To test this 
hypothesis, Dent’s first point of contention is called the ‘latticed foundation’, whereby 
it is claimed that “bilateralism may provide a sub-structural or ‘latticed’ foundation for 
regionalism to develop” (Dent, 2006: 84). As explained in the previous chapter, this 
analysis does not scrutinise bilateralism, but subregionalism. To adapt this point to 
regionalism, this study identifies indicators suggesting that the cases of regional 
cooperation have their origins in the subregional developments. The empirical 
expectation under this point is an indication that region-wide anti-piracy initiatives 
have been ‘inspired’ by subregional efforts of countering maritime piracy in the Strait 
of Malacca (where the counter-piracy measures were most pronounced). This point 
can be falsified if evidence demonstrates that regional cooperative mechanisms did 











The second and final point of contention under the region-convergent 
hypothesis suggests that region-convergent outcomes are likely when “bilateralism
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and regionalism may be involved in serving similar ends, and even working in 
concert with the other” (Dent, 2006: 85). This point is rather self-explanatory, and 
claims that if the goals and objectives of regional mechanisms match those at the 
subregional level, then subregionalism might spill-over to regional integration. The 
goals and objectives of subregional mechanisms have been outlined in the previous 
chapter. This analysis therefore examines the objectives of regional anti-piracy 
actions. If these are found to be aligned with the subregional aims, then this 
represents an indication of region-convergent outcomes. This point of contention’s 
empirical expectation also claims that subregional and regional mechanisms are 
mutually-complementary and work in concert with one another. To falsify this point is 





After all six points of contention and their empirical claims have been 
elaborated, the chapter proceeds with applying these claims to the three cases of 
pan-regional antipiracy cooperation in ASEAN. The following paragraphs test each of 
the cases against the claims made by the points of contention in the order they have 
been introduced. The analysis is case-centred in order to see whether regional 
cooperative mechanisms stem from subregional developments.
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Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 




Launched in 2004, ReCAAP is the most comprehensive regional instrument 
with a specific mandate to counter maritime piracy and armed robbery attacks. It 
involves all ASEAN member states (except Malaysia and Indonesia) and 10 extra- 
regional states. ReCAAP does not seem to bear indicators pointing towards its 
inefficiency. The most significant drawback of this mechanism is that Malaysia and 
Indonesia have not ratified ReCAAP due to concerns over sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, ReCAAP is the first anti-piracy intergovernmental partnership 
implemented to promote and strengthen piracy prevention through information- 
sharing and capacity-building. When it comes to the successes of ReCAAP, it can be 
said that: 
 
“ReCAAP has thus far been successful in formally bringing together most of 
the regional countries and stakeholders countries to come together to create 
an information sharing and capacity building platform amongst the relevant 
maritime agencies (e.g., port authorities and enforcement agencies) to combat 
piracy and armed robbery against ships” (Bateman and Chan, in Hofmeister 
and Rueppel, 2014: 74). 
 
There is a lack of evidence suggesting that ReCAAP has been affected by the 
growing significance of subregional anti-piracy mechanisms. Therefore, ReCAAP 
does seem to reject the notion that subregional cooperative mechanisms capture or 
undermine regional initiatives.
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As stated above, ReCAAP “is of limited applicability as long as Malaysia and 
Indonesia have not ratified it. Their refusal to join ReCAAP has been on the grounds 
of its implications for national sovereignty” (Passas and Twyman-Ghoshal in 
Beckerman and Roach, 2012: 77). This presents a case of inconsistency, as both 
Malaysia and Indonesia are parties of MSP, which, as outlined in the previous 
chapter, required the member states to compromise significantly on their sovereignty 
and territoriality. It is therefore confusing why the two states refused to join the 
ReCAAP initiative. ReCAAP does not seem to have emerged in response to the 
subregional cooperation in the Strait of Malacca. It cannot be considered to act as a 
counter-balancing manoeuvre. However, if Malaysia and Indonesia have a 
preference for subregionalism, then subregionalism might act as region-divergent. 
Here, the subregionalism under the MSP did not spill-over to operational cooperation 
in ReCAAP. This in itself presents empirical evidence in favour of the region- 
divergent hypothesis under the second point of contention. In terms of whether 
ReCAAP triggered inter-state rivalry within ASEAN, insofar as all the countries 
cooperate under the ReCAAP initiative, no signs of rivalry are noted. Malaysia and 
Indonesia, too, demonstrated good operational commitment towards ReCAAP 
despite not being members. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that due to Malaysia 
and Indonesia not joining ReCAAP, subregional cooperation does not seem to be 




Malaysia and Indonesia’s refusal to join the ReCAAP initiative poses a 
problem under the power asymmetries point as well. The reluctance to join this 
regional mechanism reflects a low interest of these two countries in regionalising 
security matters, like maritime safety. Not being members of ReCAAP, Malaysia and
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Indonesia can be perceived as free riders, as formally they do not contribute 
financially towards the mechanism. “Funding for the ISC comes from voluntary 
contributions from the contracting parties” (Kotani in Hofmeister and Rueppel, 2014: 
110), and as such, Indonesia and Malaysia reap the benefits of secure Southeast 
Asian waters, however without the financial burden. The absence of these two states 
does exacerbate power asymmetries within ASEAN, as other member states may 
consider this to be an expression of dominance or a lack of political will. Either way, 
there are clear indicators suggesting that the empirical narrative of ReCAAP points in 
favour of the region-divergent argument. As shown, there is evidence that the 
empirical expectations under this point are present in the functional structure of 




ReCAAP’s Information Sharing Centre (ISC) is based in Singapore. Having 
the status of an international organisation, “its operations are supervised by the 
Governing Council with one representative per contracting party. ReCAAP requires 
each member state to have a focal point, and each focal point acts as a point of 
information exchange with the ISC” (Kotani in Hofmeister and Rueppel, 2014: 110). 
The set-up of ReCAAP appears to be fair in distributing the benefits of its operations. 
In addition, ReCAAP ISC holds research seminars and promotes best practice 
exchange with national focal points and the marine industry. It appears that ReCAAP 
is built on an open and transparent foundation, with data accessible to a wide array 
of stakeholders. “ReCAAP is the first binding international legal document that 
recognizes the IMO definition of armed robbery at sea in addition to the UNCLOS 
definition of piracy” (Passas and Twyman-Ghoshal in Beckerman and Roach, 2012: 
77). Therefore, ReCAAP has been based around international norms and in line with
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the ASEAN principles. As such, there are no indications of ReCAAP being founded 
on subregional cooperative mechanisms that promote regional economic divides. 
Nor are there are indicators implying that ReCAAP contributes to an unequal 
distribution of benefits that it creates. Therefore, it can be said that ReCAAP does 
not hinder regional integration. In the absence of the empirical expectations under 
the fourth point of contention in the region-divergent hypothesis, this point is 




It can hardly be claimed that ReCAAP is built on successful cooperation in the 
Strait of Malacca, insofar as Malaysia and Indonesia failed to join the initiative. 
Clearly, ReCAAP cannot be considered an extension to the MSP mechanism. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, there exists a dense network of subregional 
initiatives and, as such, the regional arrangements should come in their place to take 
advantage of synergising each country’s own maritime programme. The fact that 
ReCAAP failed to incorporate states involved in MSP suggests the inability of 
ASEAN to aggregate subregional successes into its own maritime security fabric. 
The willingness of Indonesia and Malaysia to cooperate under the ReCAAP 
mechanism despite not being its members may be a mitigating factor in assessing 
whether subregionalism is region-convergent to regional integration. However, 
looking at the organisational structure of ReCAAP, there is a lack of empirical 
evidence suggesting that ReCAAP indeed builds upon the subregional cooperation. 
The scope of ReCAAP is not a culmination of subregional efforts and therefore, it is 
unlikely that ReCAAP is a product of subregional action. As such, the latticed 
foundation argument under the region-convergent hypothesis is falsified.
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To assess the convergence of ReCAAP with the congruent processes and 
objectives argument, the goals of ReCAAP need to be analysed. The three goals of 






- serve as a platform for information exchange with the ReCAAP Focal Points 
via the Information Network System (IFN); facilitate communications and 
information exchange among participating governments to improve incident 
response by member countries; analyse and prove accurate statistics of the 
piracy and armed robbery incidents to foster better understanding of the 




- facilitate capacity building efforts that help improve the capability of member 





- cooperate with organisations and like-minded parties on joint exercises, 
information sharing, capacity building programme, or other forms of 









These goals and objectives are largely similar to the ones presented in the 
Cooperative Mechanism. ReCAAP is an information-sharing platform, just like the 
Cooperative Mechanism. Also, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the aims of 
ReCAAP align with those of MSP. This presents a strong case for the congruence of
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subregional initiatives with their regional counterparts. These two sets of anti-piracy 
arrangements seem to work in line with one another to achieve similar goals. This 
provides indicators in favour of this argument and, therefore, the last point of 











The AMF was established at the inaugural AMF in Surabaya in July 2010. It is 
a forum encompassing a wide array of maritime cross-boundary issues that go 
beyond security concerns, such as marine environmental protection, safety of 
navigation, illegal fishing and marine resources extraction, maritime transportation, 
smuggling and trafficking, etc. Piracy and armed robbery are not at the core of AMF 
and “while the AMF aims to be ‘non-security centric’, it contributes to maritime 
security by taking care of the other dimensions of maritime issues” 
(Chalermpalanupap and Ibanez in Beckman and Roach, 2012: 143). There lacks a 
similar forum in any of the ASEAN’s subregions and the AMF has found its niche 
modus operanti to contribute to securitising ASEAN’s waters, including the adoption 
of concrete measures to counter maritime piracy. The AMF is considered to have 
been reasonably efficient in bringing states together to collectively develop strategies 
and share best practices to counter maritime piracy in the region. It is also for these 
reasons that the AMF has now given rise to a spin-off initiative named the Expanded 
ASEAN Maritime Forum. AMF has placed maritime issues firmly on the ASEAN’s 
agenda. It does not appear that development on the subregional level had a negative 
impact on the operation of AMF. This initiative has developed esteem in its own right 
and mechanisms adopted at the Strait of Malacca do not seem to capture or
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undermine the AMF. Therefore, it can be claimed that the AMF and the evidence it 
brings do not meet the empirical expectations under the undermining and capturing 
cause argument. Thus in the absence of the aforementioned indicators, this point of 




Since all three Strait of Malacca littoral states are members of the AMF, there 
is a lack of evidence indicating the presence of the empirical expectation under the 
point of counter-balancing manoeuvres and regional inter-state rivalry. Moreover, the 
AMF did not trigger interstate rivalry within ASEAN, as all members are committed to 
achieving a common goal: to protect the marine environment and safeguard vessels 
operating in their maritime region. The AMF has been enjoying a position of growing 
importance on the ASEAN security agenda, focusing primarily on issues of 
institutional connectivity. With a clearly-defined objective and ASEAN member 
states, including the subregional partners, working in concert to securitise the 
ASEAN maritime environment, the AMF does not showcase evidence in support of 
the second point of contention under the region-divergent hypothesis. Therefore, this 
point is falsified, as suggested by experiences of the AMF. 
 
 
The AMF serves to provide a platform for the stakeholders to engage in a 
dialogue and policy recommendations regarding the safety of navigation and marine 
environment protection measures. Unlike the ReCAAP, AMF is endorsed by all the 
ASEAN member states, including Malaysia and Indonesia. This is because AMF is 
non-binding and it is based on volunteerism, rather than obligation. No concessions 
on sovereignty are required. The success of AMF can be measured by its longevity, 
whereby thus far, there have been 4 AMFs with the 5th AMF to take place in Vietnam
- 86 -  
in August 2014. Moreover, the eAMF is the first track 1.5 mechanism on maritime 
issues with the participation of ASEAN member states and major nations in the wider 
East Asia region. In September 2013, there was a 2nd eAMF in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia. The location is of significance, as, in this way, Malaysia demonstrates a 
strong commitment to securitising the marine environment, which counterbalances 
its lack of participation in ReCAAP. Insofar as the AMF serves to bolster ASEAN 
maritime collaboration through joint activities, dialogue, knowledge-exchange and 
policy-oriented focus groups, then there is no reason to suggest that power 
asymmetries are at play in AMF. The issue of free-riders is also one of negligence 
under the AMF, as the forum works on a voluntary basis. These indicators suggest 
that subregionalism does not interfere with regional integration in the domain of 
maritime security. Therefore, in the absence of empirical expectations under this 





The AMF was launched in response to the growing importance of maritime 
issues within Southeast Asia, especially with regard to concerns over maritime safety 
and the marine environment. With sea piracy on ASEAN’s agenda, the South China 
Sea territorial disputes and marine conservation issues, there was an obvious need 
to set up a common regional platform to better tackle the maritime challenges. As 
demonstrated, the AMF stems from a pragmatic need to react to the growing and 
increasingly complex maritime issues. As such, the AMF, like ReCAAP, offers 
transparent and non-contentious measures to help protect ASEAN waters. “While 
the AMF aims to be ‘non-security centric’, it contributes to maritime security by taking 
care of the other dimensions of maritime issues which, in turn, complement efforts
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for greater maritime security” (Chalermpalanupap and Ibanez in Beckerman and 
Roach, 2012: 143). This contributes to an enhanced ability of the participating states 
to engage and take advantage of the topics AMF deals with. The AMF amply 
discusses issues which are not politically sensitive, but which have an effect on 
national security. Examining the modus operanti of the AMF, it can be concluded that 
it has not been built upon subregional mechanisms divisive to the region’s economic 




The issue of maritime piracy in the Strait of Malacca is just one among the 
plethora of concerns plaguing the maritime domain of ASEAN. It is fair to suggest 
that subregional developments in the Strait of Malacca placed maritime piracy in the 
limelight of ASEAN security strategy. The roles of MSP, the Cooperative Mechanism 
and the Batam Statement cannot be ignored when assessing whether the AMF has 
been influenced by subregional developments. It is reasonable to suggest that the 
Strait of Malacca littoral states, as active participants, bring their experience of 
fighting maritime piracy to the AMF. The strategy deployed at the Strait of Malacca 
finds its way via the AMF to influence regional action. Since the purpose of the AMF 
is to share knowledge of resolving maritime issues and to exchange best practices in 
maritime cooperation, the littoral states certainly showcased their successful 
mechanisms to the wider ASEAN community. In this way, there is a reasonable 
assumption that the AMF builds upon the subregional developments. As such, in the 
presence of indicators favouring the latticed foundation argument, this point fails to 
be rejected.
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The goals and objectives of the AMF are best described in the Chairman's 
 







The ASEAN Member States discussed and exchanged views on the following: 
(a) maritime security and cooperation in ASEAN; (b) maintaining freedom and 
safety of navigation and addressing sea piracy; (c) protecting the marine 
environment and promoting eco-tourism and fishery regime in East Asia; and 
(d) future work of the ASEAN Maritime Forum. They agreed that maritime 
security and cooperation should contribute to the three pillars of ASEAN 
community building, namely, the ASEAN Political Security Community, the 
ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. 
 







Again, the AMF serves to exchange views and best practices among the ASEAN 
member states. The topics that the AMF deals with are similar to the concerns of 
ASEAN’s subregions, including the Strait of Malacca. The fact that maritime piracy 
and safety of navigation are mentioned as points a) and b) is an indication of the 
significance that ASEAN ascribes to countering maritime piracy. It matches the 
commitments of the Strait of Malacca littoral states to fight piracy in their waters. 
Therefore, this provides strong evidence of the convergence of goal and objectives 
on subregional and regional levels. Hence, in the presence of indicators outlined by 
empirical expectations in this point, the last point of contention under the region- 
convergent hypothesis fails to be rejected.
- 89 -  
ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other 
 




ASCAP was signed on the 17th June 2003. The statement reaffirms the 
commitment of ARF participating states to secure the international waters from acts 
of piracy. In the Statement, the ARF participants commit to encourage bilateral and 
multilateral maritime anti-piracy cooperation, in addition to providing “technical 
assistance and capacity-building infrastructure to countries that need help in 
developing necessary laws, extending training, and where and when possible, 
providing equipment” (ARF, 2003). Even though the ASCAP belongs to the group of 
mechanisms with a low level of impact on countering maritime piracy, it cannot be 
said that the ASCAP had been dwarfed by subregional cooperation in the Strait of 
Malacca. The ASCAP is an important region-wide statement encouraging the 
members to hold “respective anti-piracy exercises on the basis of respecting 
fundamental ASEAN norms, such as the non-intervention into each other’s affairs 
and the principle of voluntary participation” (Loewen in Hofmeister and Rueppel, 
 
2014: 16). Statements like the Batam Statement between the Strait of Malacca 
littoral states do not present competition for region-wide initiatives like the ASCAP. 
Therefore, it can be suggested that there lacks evidence that the ASCAP has been 




It is beyond the ASCAP’s scope to engage in reactive counter-balancing. The 
ASCAP is also incapable as a tool of interstate rivalry. Judging from the purpose of 
the ASCAP’s implementation, “the main aim of this document was to encourage 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation among ARF members to combat piracy”
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(Loewen in Hofmeister and Rueppel, 2014: 16). Therefore, it is clear that this 
document has not been signed to counterbalance the subregional developments in 
the Strait of Malacca. In the absence of the indicators suggesting that the ASCAP 
might have acted to counterbalance the subregional developments or to have been 
used as a tool of interstate rivalry, the second point of contention is considered 





The ASCAP neither reflects nor exacerbates power asymmetries within the 
ASEAN regional grouping. Even though it is a region-wide initiative, it serves to 
bolster multilateral cooperation, whilst adhering to the ‘ASEAN way’ principles. In this 
way, bilateral and multilateral cooperation contributed to the adoption of a region- 
wide guiding document on the issues of maritime security. This, in itself, presents a 
case of subregionalism being region-convergent to regional action. Still, going back 
to the power asymmetries argument, insofar as none of the ASEAN member states 
were excluded from the agreement, it cannot be claimed that the ASCAP was driven 
by power politics in the region. ASEAN’s approach appears to be rooted in 
pragmatism and simply ensuring the Southeast Asian waters are kept safe from acts 
of maritime piracy. Therefore, it is fair to suggest that the ASCAP bears no indicators 





Typical to agreements with a low level of impact on regional politics, the 
ASCAP too has had only a limited influence of the distribution of economic benefits 
across ASEAN. Not only it is difficult to measure whether the benefits created by the
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ASCAP are distributed equally, but it is also questionable precisely what value the 
ASCAP brings. The ASCAP is a document promoting bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation among the members of ARF. Nevertheless, analytically it is unfeasible 
to conduct a study on which bilateral and multilateral instances of cooperation were 
results of the ASCAP. Since the patterns of distribution under the ASCAP cannot be 
measured, it can only be assumed that the ASCAP was not based on multi-speed 
subregional mechanisms. In the absence of empirical expectations outlined by this 




In terms of the ASCAP, the statement was signed in 2003, which is one year 
before the MSP came into force. This time sequence does not suggest that the 
ASCAP had been influenced by the anti-piracy developments in the Strait of 
Malacca. The Statement clearly identifies the reasons behind its ratification. Under 
Point 1, parts C and D claim: 
 
c)    Maritime security is an indispensable and fundamental condition for the 
welfare and economic security of the ARF region. Ensuring this security is in 
the direct interest of all countries, and in particular the ARF countries; 
 
d)    Most maritime armed-robberies in the Asia-Pacific region tend to occur in 
the coastal and archipelagic waters. Trends over the last few years indicate 
that piracy and armed-robbery against ships continue to threaten to be a 
significant problem in the Asia-Pacific region; 
 
(ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Security, 2003, 
online)
- 92 -  
It is clear that these are pragmatic reasons responding to the growing threat of 
maritime piracy to the economies of ARF member states. Therefore, it cannot be 
claimed that subregional cooperation provided the latticed foundation for the ASCAP. 
With this evidence speaking against the region-convergent argument, it needs to be 
claimed that the ASCAP does not seem to bear indicators in line with the empirical 





The objectives and aims of the ASCAP are the drivers of the Statement. 
Throughout the entire statement, there are objectives identified that overlap with the 
regional strategy of achieving these. Perhaps the most concise and relevant section 






The ARF Participants will work together to protect ships engaged in 
international voyages by: 
 
a) Enhancing cooperation on fighting piracy and armed-robbery in the 
region between ARF participants’ shipping and organizations such as the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Piracy Reporting Center of 
the International Maritime Bureau (IMB); 
 
b)    Early implementation of the comprehensive amendment to the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and the new ISPS 
Code adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security in 
December 2002; as called for in Conference Resolution 6.
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c)    Affirming their responsibilities to prosecute, in accordance with relevant 
domestic laws, perpetrators of acts of piracy and armed-robbery against 
ships. 
 
d)    Endorsing the development by the International Maritime Organization of 
the following instruments and recommendations/ guidance for use in 
preventing and suppressing piracy and armed-robbery against ships. 
 









The appeal to respect UNCLOS, IMO, IMB and other international covenants 
dealing with international maritime conduct is also shared amongst subregional 
cooperative mechanisms. In MSP, Cooperative Mechanisms, but most evidently in 
the Batam Statement, there are patent clauses referring to these international 
organisations and covenants. Therefore, the objectives and goals (including the 
strategy) of the ASCAP and subregional developments are in line with one another. 
The ASCAP too bears indicators suggesting convergence with this point of 
contention and its empirical expectations. Therefore, the congruent processes and 
objectives argument fails to be falsified.







As shown, none of the three cases of region-wide cooperation meet the 
empirical expectations under the undermining and capturing cause point of 
contention. This is because in all cases, there is a lacking evidence of subregional 
cooperation taking over key aspects of region-wide initiatives. The ReCAAP, AMF 
and ASCAP are developments that not only supplement subregional efforts, but are 
unique region-wide mechanisms to tackle piracy in Southeast Asian waters. 
Subregionalism in the Malacca Strait does not interfere with these activities, due to 
the efficient operation of these regional mechanisms. It must be addressed that 
when talking about the achievements of ASEAN-wise mechanisms, one has to be 
realistic. Under the norms and principles of ASEAN, it is difficult to develop 
mechanisms similar to the MSP. However, given the realities that ASEAN faces, like 
the territorial disputes, concerns over sovereignty, consensual decision-making, etc., 
all of the three cases of regional cooperation are rightfully considered to be 
reasonably successful. This point of contention is, however, rejected based on the 
selected cases of regional cooperation, which provides a reason to suggest that the 




Only ReCAAP demonstrated indicators under the empirical expectations 
 
based on the second point of contention in the region-divergent hypothesis. Malaysia 
and Indonesia did not join ReCAAP, thus there has been no spill-over or region- 
convergent trajectory from the MSP mechanism. This, in itself, can suggest that 
subregional cooperation is rather region-divergent. However, these two countries, 
despite not joining ReCAAP, do demonstrate sound operational cooperation within
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the ReCAAP framework. Moreover, in the cases of both AMF and ASCAP, there are 
no indicators of the empirical expectations under this point of contention. Even 
though ReCAAP might problematise the subregional-regional nexus by bringing in 
complexities, evidence from the other two regional anti-piracy cooperative 
mechanisms do not support the counter-balancing manoeuvres and regional inter- 




The ASCAP and AMF, as initiatives strictly following the principles enshrined 
in the ASEAN Charter, have not been used as instruments of power politics. Neither 
do they exacerbate power asymmetries within the ASEAN region. This is because 
they are based on voluntary participation and act as knowledge-exchange platforms. 
In contrast, ReCAAP bears indicators of power asymmetries, as Malaysia and 
Indonesia refused to join this initiative. Therefore, whereas the ASCAP and AMF do 
falsify the claim made by the third point of contention, ReCAAP seems to provide 
enough evidence to fail to falsify the argument. However, in light of the fact that 
Malaysia hosted the latest eAMF and both Malaysia and Indonesia show goodwill 
and support for the ReCAAP mechanism, it can overall be concluded that the 
regional mechanisms do not provide sufficient evidence resembling the empirical 





None of the three scrutinised cases of regional cooperation demonstrate 
indicators suggesting that they have been based on previous mechanisms, which 
had been divisive to the economic development across ASEAN. Nor does it appear 
that the cases have triggered such a response. Here, it is important to bear in mind
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that ASEAN is a hugely diverse region with some of the world’s richest and the 
world’s poorest economies. Moreover, whilst some countries, like the Philippines or 
Indonesia, are maritime countries completely dependent on maritime trade, 
transportation and resources, other states, like Laos, are landlocked. The divergent 
interest in regional mechanisms securitising Southeast Asian waters is a natural 
phenomenon based on the regional geopolitical milieu. It is not surprising that the 
regional mechanisms benefit some countries more than others. The purpose of this 
point of contention, however, is to spot instances where a case of regional 
cooperation benefited some countries at the expense of their regional partners. 
Alternatively, it is important to identify instances when the benefits were shared 
disproportionately based on the member states’ commitment, economic power and 
social makeup. Yet perhaps due to the principles known as the ‘ASEAN way’, the 
economic and other benefits seemed to have been shared proportionately. The most 
important beneficiaries were the maritime nations, namely the Philippines and 
Indonesia. Based on the observations of the three selected cases of regional anti- 
piracy cooperation, it can be claimed that the point of contention arguing in favour of 





Only the AMF bears indicators of the empirical expectations under this point 
of contention. This is because of its open and transparent knowledge-sharing 
mission. Both ReCAAP and the ASCAP do not support the “latticed foundation” 
argument. Whilst in the case of ReCAAP, there is missing evidence of the 
subregional-regional trajectory of cooperation, under the ASCAP, there is clear 
evidence against claims suggesting subregional cooperation was a reason that
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ASCAP was signed. The Statement is clear on the reasons why it came into 
existence and the fact that it was signed in 2003, before any significant subregional 
mechanisms took place, suggests that the ASCAP was not a product of 
subregionalism. On the other hand, it needs to be pointed out that the ASCAP is a 
low-level statement with limited impact on the regional anti-piracy strategy. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of solid evidence in favour of empirical expectations 
stated by this point of contention, it needs to be concluded that the ‘latticed 




When examining the founding documents behind all of the three 
aforementioned cases of regional cooperation, evidence suggests that their goals 
and objectives are congruent with subregionalism at the Strait of Malacca. There are 
parallels between the objectives of ReCAAP and MSP and the Cooperative 
Mechanism, between AMF and the Cooperative Mechanism and finally between the 
ASCAP and the Batam Statement. This strong empirical evidence supports the 
claims made by this second point of contention under the region-convergent 
hypothesis. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that, given the presence of 
indicators of empirical expectations, the last point of contention under the region- 




Subjecting the pan-regional anti-piracy mechanisms to the test presented by 
the four claims under the region-divergent hypothesis, the test shows that there is 
insufficient evidence to fail to reject this hypothesis. All of the four points of 
contention have been falsified due to the lacking indicators found in the pan-regional 
initiatives that would conform to the empirical expectations of the hypothesis’ claims.
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Therefore, it is unlikely that region-wide anti-piracy mechanisms have been 




However, region-convergent outcomes have been shown inconclusive. This is 
because, whereas the latticed foundation argument has been falsified, the congruent 
processes and objectives argument has failed to be falsified. This is due to all three 
regional anti-piracy mechanisms demonstrating the absence of indicators under the 
first point of contention and the presence of indicators under the second one in the 
region-convergent hypothesis. With evidence pointing in opposing directions, the 
regional mechanisms neither reject nor fail to reject the region-convergent 
hypothesis. Overall, the evidence from the pan-regional activities suggests that 
region-convergent outcomes of subregional cooperation are more likely.
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The objective of this thesis was to answer the research puzzle of whether 
subregionalism is region-convergent or region-divergent to regionalism. The 
research adapted the theoretical framework by Christopher Dent (2006) to the case 





The analytical framework consisted of two contrasting hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that subregionalism is region-divergent to regionalism, whereas 
Hypothesis 2 claimed that the effect is region-convergent. To test these hypotheses, 
a series of claims, known as the points of contention, was presented. This approach 




The points of contention under the region-divergent hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) 
are: 1) the undermining and capturing effect, 2) intensifying bilateralism 
(subregionalism) and regional inter-state rivalry, 3) reinforced power asymmetries, 
and 4) multi-speed subregionalism and the development divide. Under the region- 
convergent division (Hypothesis 2), there are two points of contention: 1) sub- 
structural or ‘latticed’ foundation, and 2) congruent processes and objectives.
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A representative sample of three cases of subregional cooperation and three 
cases of regional cooperation were tested against the aforementioned points of 
contention. The three selected cases of subregional cooperation in countering piracy 
in the Malacca Strait are the MSP, the Cooperative Mechanism and the Batam 
Statement. The three selected cases of regional cooperation in countering piracy in 




Falsifiable theoretical and empirical expectations under the points of 
contention were firstly expressed to set up the test. Subsequently, the selected 
cases of subregional and regional anti-piracy cooperation were subjected to the test 




Based on the degree to which the cases conformed to the theoretical and 
empirical expectations, the point of contention in question was assessed to be either 
falsified or failed to be falsified. With four points of contention in the region-divergent 
hypothesis and two points of contention in the region-convergent hypothesis, the 
hypotheses were deemed falsified if more than 50% of their points of contention 
were falsified. If exactly one half of their points of contention were falsified, the 




Results of these tests show that the subregional cases of anti-piracy 
cooperation in the Strait of Malacca demonstrate a region-convergent effect on pan- 
ASEAN initiatives in the domain of maritime security. This conclusion has been 
reached by falsifying the region-divergent hypothesis and failing to falsify the region- 
convergent hypothesis. All of the subregional cases demonstrated the presence of
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empirical indicators under both points of contention in the region-convergent 
hypothesis. There was only one exception, where the Batam Statement neither 




Pan-regional cooperation presented a weaker case for the region-convergent 
hypothesis. The three cases of regional cooperation overall did fail to falsify the 
second point of contention under the region-convergent hypothesis. However, in the 
case of the latticed foundation argument, the evidence from regional cooperation has 
proven to falsify this claim. Overall, the regional cooperation and its evidence were 
determined to be inconclusive about the validity of the second hypothesis. All four 
points of contention under the first hypothesis were falsified by all three cases of 
subregional cooperation. The only exception was the case of ReCAAP, which failed 
to falsify the reinforced power asymmetries argument. Overall, however, the first 




The subregional and regional cooperation and their tests present a strong 
case in favour of the argument that subregionalism is region-convergent to 
regionalism. There are evident limitations and issues surrounding the generalisability 
of this study, its relatively small-n, the absence of primary data, triangulation and 
mixed methods. These will be discussed in the following paragraphs. However, this 
research achieved the successful development of an analytical framework for testing 
the effect of subregional action to regionalism. This is important, because it is the 
first time such an analysis has been carried out in the regional security domain.
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This thesis also brought a significant finding stating that subregional 
cooperation and regional initiatives are correlated, thus nullifying the null hypothesis. 
There is an absence of indicators suggesting that such a correlation is non-existent 
and therefore it can be concluded that the two variables are positively correlated with 




This analytical framework can be adapted to any of the world’s regions, taking 
any issue are as the focal point. The applicability of this framework is its strength. 
Christopher Dent’s analytical framework scrutinised the impact of economic 
bilateralism between Thailand and Singapore on ASEAN economic regionalism. This 
thesis demonstrates the applicability of Dent’s framework by having it successfully 
applied to the case of anti-piracy cooperation in the Strait of Malacca. The framework 
is promising insofar as it brings an innovative and systematic approach to 
scrutinising a vast array of regional issues. Its usefulness lies in the ability to 
precipitate policy recommendations based on the subregional-regional architecture 
of the issue in question. The policy recommendation derived from this thesis is to 
base regional security approaches on transparent, open-ended and potent networks 
of bilateral and subregional ties among ASEAN members.






It is acknowledged that this thesis faces several limitations. One of the 
limitations is the relatively small sample of six cases (three subregional and three 
regional cases). Although these cases are considered representative and much 
consideration was given when choosing the sample, it would be ideal to test all of the 
instances of anti-piracy measures in ASEAN. It is also difficult to compartmentalise 
the cases into the two categories of subregional and regional. This is because some 
of the mechanisms, like ReCAAP, whilst operating on the regional level, do not have 
a full participation on part of the ASEAN member states. Others, like ASCAP, involve 




Another limitation lies in the choice of research methods. Whereas this thesis 
uses the case study analysis, it deploys a small-n qualitative method of inquiry, 
relying only on secondary data and information. The use of primary data would help 
bolster the arguments made by this thesis, however, the availability of primary data 
is scarce. Mixed methods analysis could also have complemented the research 
findings, yet this approach was not opted for in the interest of the depth of the 
analysis given the word count limit of this thesis. The same can be said about 
triangulation of the data, which is also an exercise that was not opted in when 




The generalisability of this study poses a limitation, as the results are only 
applicable to specific geopolitical circumstances – namely the anti-piracy 
mechanisms in the Strait of Malacca and ASEAN. It could be true that the Southeast
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Asian region is naturally prone to piracy attacks and the observed results are merely 
a natural variation. Although as the data and the research findings are of limited 
generalisability, the analytical framework is widely applicable across a wide spectrum 




The last limitation of this research is the relatively modest usage of secondary 
literature. This is because the topic area is not extensively covered and can also be 
labelled as understudied. No research of the causal relationship between 
subregionalism and regionalism has been conducted. This makes the research topic 
very niche and relevant literature is sparse. The most relevant article was the one by 
Christopher Dent (2006), to which this thesis refers extensively.





Firstly, it should be noted that whereas subregional cooperation bolsters 
regionalism, regionalism, in turn, does not make subregionalism redundant. 
Initiatives at both levels continue to be strongly present and complementary in 
nature. Ganesan and Amer (2009) present the core and periphery argument, 
suggesting that subregional cooperation remains the focal point of counter-piracy 
strategies even in the presence of region-wide maritime security mechanisms. 
Therefore, one of the ways “to conceptualize the relationship between bilateralism 
and multilateralism is to think of them as avenues in a layered process where states 
retain a core of bilateral transactions that are then supplemented by increasingly 
larger fora as the arena radiates outward” (Ganesan and Amer, 2009: 330). This 
concept should be further explored, since it is intellectually interesting to predict what 
happens beyond the region-convergent effect of subregionalism. Ganesan and Amer 
claim that bilateralism and multilateralism coexist and supplement each other in a 
positive-sum game. Scholars like Heller also assert that processes of bilateralism 
and multilateralism are, in fact, complementary and can coexist with countries 
yielding benefits from both avenues. ASEAN also supports this notion in its official 
statements, stating that states should “encourage bilateral and multilateral maritime 
cooperation among ARF members to combat piracy” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003: 3, 
added emphasis). A graphical illustration of this point is presented here:
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Secondly, future research of the causal relationship between subregionalism 
and regionalism could also include other cases within the same unit, for instance 
other subregional and regional cases within ASEAN in other issue areas than 
maritime piracy. Cooperation in the transboundary haze, environmental protection, 
human trafficking or arms smuggling are all timely and relevant topics of research in 
the Southeast Asian context. Especially promising is the prospect of applying this 





Thirdly, this research should also make a wider use of primary research 
methods, such as interviews. Interviews with key decision-makers can serve to 
further illuminate the rationale behind the development of regional mechanisms and 
whether subregionalism played a role in their adoption. Quantitative methods should 
also be used more extensively, such as national and regional budget spending.
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The fourth set of recommendations concerns the usage of IR theoretical 
approaches to guide the theoretical explanations of the regional and subregional 
dynamics in a given issue area. Mid-range theories, like state socialisation, ideas 
diffusion and regional regimes could serve to provide auxiliary theoretical 




The fifth recommendation is to incorporate the confounding variables and 
noise into the analysis. As notoriously problematic in social sciences, the variables 
are difficult to isolate to create the ideas testing conditions. However, some of the 
major confounding variables, like exogenous or endogenous shocks, the geopolitical 




Lastly, the sixth set of recommendations is to apply the findings of this 
research to policy recommendations and regional strategic points. This approach 
has a unique value in discerning the levels at which the efficiency of countering an 
issue is maximised. The analytical framework can be used as an evaluative tool of 
policy prescriptions to shape the regional strategies of countering issues like 
maritime piracy.
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